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THE STUDENT BORROWER: SLAVE 
TO THE SERVICER? 
 
William J. Cox* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
[T]he borrower is slave to the lender.”1 This old Christian proverb 
rang true for centuries, but as time has progressed, so has the 
complexity of our financial transactions.2 For most of human history, 
lenders collected on, or serviced, the loans they originated. Today, 
third parties known as loan servicers typically perform this function.3 
However, these servicers have no accountability to the borrowers they 
collect from and often little accountability to the lenders with whom 
they contract.4 This system of lending has become particularly 
troubling in the context of student loans, shackling our nation’s youth 
                                                            
*  Senior Symposia Editor, Michigan State Law Review; J.D. 2015, Michigan 
State University College of Law; B.A. 2012, The Ohio State University. The author 
would like to thank Professor Mark Totten for his invaluable guidance and support 
during the writing of this Article. The author would also like to thank Katherine 
Wendt for her feedback and editorial assistance. Finally, the author would like to 
thank the staff of the Loyola Consumer Law Review for all their helpful edits. 
1 Proverbs 22:7. 
2 See generally Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial 
Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657 (2012) 
(discussing how growing complexities in financial markets complicates regulation). 
3 See What’s the Difference Between a Mortgage Lender and a Servicer?, 
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Nov. 4, 2013), 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/198/whats-the-difference-between-a-
mortgage-lender-and-a-servicer.html. 
4 See infra notes 111-114 and accompanying text (discussing how no party to 
the student loan transaction holds both the ability and the incentive to hold a student 
loan servicer accountable). 
“ 
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with the heavy chains of student loan debt.5 Today, it seems that the 
student borrower is slave to the servicer. 
 Currently, outstanding student loan debt stands at over $1.2 
trillion.6 This amount eclipses all other forms of consumer debt in the 
American economy aside from mortgage debt.7 In July 2013, the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) issued a report 
detailing the troubling story behind this staggering number and the 
domino effect it has on other financial markets.8 For instance, high 
amounts of student loan debt are forcing students to move back in 
with their parents instead of buying a house,9 forgo start-up business 
opportunities in favor of safer job opportunities,10 and dismiss job 
opportunities in certain underserved sectors and locations.11 In fact, 
the median net worth of college graduates who are under forty and 
have student loan debt is only $8,700.12  
 Student loans are shackling our youth. This Article focuses on 
the problems of the student loan servicing market, how these 
problems have contributed to the staggering amount of student loan 
debt, and how these problems can be solved.  
                                                            
5 See infra Section II.B (detailing the rampant abuses students faced under this 
system).  
6 Rohit Chopra, Student Debt Swells, Federal Loans Now Top a Trillion, 
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (July 17, 2013), 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/student-debt-swells-federal-loans-now-
top-a-trillion/. However, the CFPB speculates the actual amount of student loan debt 
might be much larger. Id. 
7 Eamon Javers, Parents Face the Student Loan Double Whammy, USA TODAY 
(Sept. 2, 2013), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/09/02/parents-student-
loan/2749233/. 
8 Student Loan Affordability: Analysis of Public Input on Impact and Solutions, 
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU,  7-11 (2013), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201305_cfpb_rfi-report_student-loans.pdf. 
9 Id. at 7 (explaining how home-ownership rates among the young have vastly 
decreased as a result of student debt).  
10 Id. at 8-9. 
11 Id. at 9-11. The report specifically mentions the health care and teaching 
sectors as those that have been the hardest hit by rising student loan debt. Id. at 9-
10. Rural areas are the hardest hit locations. Id. at 10-11.  
12 Walter Hamilton, Median Net Worth of Grads Under 40 with Student Debt Is 
Only $8,700, LOS ANGELES TIMES (May 14, 2014, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-young-people-with-student-debt-have-
median-net-worth-of-only-8700-20140514-story.html.  
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 A loan servicer is an entity that handles the day-to-day 
management of loans.13 Loan servicers are often not the same entity 
as the entity that originated or made the loan.14 In the student lending 
arena, this is particularly true because the government originates all 
federal loans while contracting out servicing work to the largest 
student loan servicers.15 The abuses reported to the CFPB include 
allegations that servicers are misapplying payments; applying 
payments late; applying payments to loans with the lowest principal 
and interest over those loans with higher amounts and interest rates; 
giving inaccurate payoff information; placing students in the wrong 
repayment plan; and transferring loans without adequate notice to 
students.16 These abuses lead to excessive fees and extended 
repayment times, hindering students’ ability to pay off their debt.17 
 Several issues currently exist in the student loan servicing 
market. First, students are generally not economists.18 Using the 
economic principles of rational choice theory, scholars have pointed 
out that students are not economically rational, but instead display a 
heavy optimism bias in their financial investments.19  
 Second, the relationship resulting from the complex lender–
student–servicer structure poses major obstacles to holding servicers 
accountable for their actions. Some scholars have diagnosed this 
problem as a principal–agent issue, where servicers (the agents) have 
little to no incentive to do the bidding of their principals (lenders) and 
                                                            
13 See Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON 
REG. 1, 23 (2011). The main responsibilities of servicers are transactional in nature: 
sending payment statements to borrowers, collecting payments from borrowers, 
applying payments from borrowers, and tracking account balances. Id. 
14 See What’s the Difference Between a Mortgage Lender and a Servicer?, 
supra note 3. 
15 Christine DiGangi, Scoring Sallie Mae: How Student Loan Servicers are 
Rated, FOXBUSINESS.COM (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-
finance/2013/10/02/scoring-sallie-mae-how-student-loan-servicers-are-rated/22. 
16 See infra Section II.B. 
17 Id. 
18 While some may aspire to be, the issue of high student loan debt and the 
obstacles to repayment caused by servicing abuses may well cut off these students’ 
access to such a commendable goal. 
19 Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
1, 8 (2008) (“Markets and contracts can be relied upon to maximize welfare only 
when consumers are rational and informed.”); id. at 9 (discussing how optimism 
bias and risk underestimation affects consumers’ financial transactions). 
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even less incentive to do what is best for the borrower, who is left out 
of this relationship.20 Under this type of transaction, students are not 
technically consumers of “servicing products” and lack a contractual 
relationship with the servicer.21 Instead, it is the lender who has made 
a contract with the servicer and who has privity with the servicer.22 
This can leave consumers outside the safety of both common law 
remedies23 and some state consumer protection laws.24  
 Third, the statutory fixes to the consumer financial market 
made under the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act and the recent actions of the Executive Branch are not 
sufficient to fix the problems currently plaguing the student loan 
servicing market.25 Even the CFPB’s power to supervise certain 
institutions that engage in “unfair, deceptive, or abusive act[s] or 
practice[s]” (UDAAPs)26 is inadequate and will be of no use to state 
attorneys general (SAGs),27 who have traditionally been at the 
forefront of consumer protection.28 In spite of President Obama’s June 
2014 presidential memorandum and the Department of Education’s 
subsequent renegotiation of its contracts with federal student loan 
servicers, student borrowers will still face abuses from federal loan 
servicers because the order does not create the sort of enforcement 
                                                            
20 Levitin & Twomey, supra note 13, at 69-70, 79-81.  
21 Id. at 83. 
22 See id. at 81-83. 
23 See infra Part III. 
24 See infra notes 181-197 (discussing state consumer protection laws and their 
applicability in the servicing market). 
25 See infra Section V.A (discussing how the statutory changes made regarding 
servicer regulation apply only to mortgage servicers and how the statutory 
presumption against preemption does not apply to potential preemption of state 
consumer protection laws by the Higher Education Act). 
26 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (2012). 
27 Gail Hillebrand, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Title X of the 
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, 8 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 219, 223 (2011) (discussing the need for many enforcers in 
consumer protection and how the inability for SAGs to enforce the general UDAAP 
prohibition is an “odd wrinkle”). 
28 Mark Totten, Credit Reform and the States: The Vital Role of Attorneys 
General After Dodd–Frank, 99 IOWA L. REV. 115, 123-24 (2013)  (discussing how 
before federal preemption ramped up, “[s]tates had been at the forefront of 
consumer protection in the banking field for over a century”). 
Cox Article.docx (Do Not Delete)  3/9/15  5:45 PM 
2015 The Student Borrower 193 
mechanism that is required and advocated for in this Article.29 In any 
event, these actions do not affect private student loan servicers and 
will not protect student borrowers in the private market.30 
 A solution to the problems plaguing student loan servicing will 
not be easy, but as the subprime mortgage crisis illustrates, any 
practical solution will involve the states playing a central role.31 
Throughout the mortgage crisis, a recurring issue was that the states 
lacked the power to enforce many of their consumer protection laws 
against national banks and their subsidiaries.32 While the Dodd–Frank 
Act provides greater consumer financial protection, the mortgage 
crisis has proven that the federal government is often too large and too 
slow to react to rapidly changing financial markets.33 Further, the 
servicing fixes in the Dodd–Frank Act were too finely tuned to the 
issues prevalent in the mortgage market and will not provide much 
relief in the context of student loan abuses.34 Instead, the CFPB must 
step up and use its rulemaking power to define specifically the acts or 
practices that constitute a UDAAP.35 Additionally, the states—who 
attempted to lead the way during the mortgage crisis36—must be 
                                                            
29 See Helping Struggling Federal Student Loan Borrowers Manage Their Debt, 
79 Fed. Reg. 33,843 (June 9, 2014); Michael Stratford, Feds Overhaul Servicing 
Contracts, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 2, 2014),  
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/09/02/education-department-
renegotiates-contracts-student-loan-servicers 
30 Helping Struggling Federal Student Loan Borrowers Manage Their Debt, 79 
Fed. Reg. 33,843; Stratford supra note 29. 
31 The Causes and Current State of the Fin. Crisis: Hrg. Before the Fin. Crisis 
Inquiry Comm’n 4 (Ill. 2010) (testimony of Ill. Att’y Gen. Lisa Madigan), 
http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0114-
Madigan.pdf [hereinafter Madigan Testimony]. 
32 See Totten, supra note 28, at 123-25 (discussing obstruction by federal 
regulators, who preempted state regulatory attempts). 
33 See Carliss N. Chatman, HOLA Preemption and the Original Intent of 
Congress: Are Federal Thrifts Necessary to Stabilize the Housing Market?, 18 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 565, 606 (2013) (“The federal government has proven 
that it is slow to react to changes in the residential mortgage industry, and that the 
changing tides in Washington can have a major impact on its regulation of mortgage 
servicing.”). Further, federal regulation of student loan servicers is almost 
exclusively within the authority of the CFPB, and when power over a market is so 
highly concentrated, there is always the possibility of agency capture. See infra 
notes 304-305 and accompanying text. 
34 See infra Section VI.A. 
35 See infra Section VI.B. 
36 See infra Section IV.B. 
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given the power to act as a second line of defense, behind the CFPB, 
in the protection of consumers in the field of student loan servicing.37  
 Part II of this Article details the problems inherent in the 
average consumer of student loans and the abuses perpetrated by 
student loan servicers. Part III discusses the problems students face 
when attempting to bring their own suits. Part IV chronicles the dearth 
of federal regulation that has existed in the servicing arena, including 
the role the states have played in filling that void. Part V discusses the 
impact of the new consumer protection regulations on the servicing 
market, most importantly the creation of the CFPB. Finally, Part VI 
proposes that these changes are insufficient, and suggests three 
strategies to bring greater accountability to the student loan servicing 
market: (1) greater access to consumer choice in choosing servicers; 
(2) CFPB rulemaking to define what constitutes a UDAAP in the 
market; and (3) the use of a coordinated SAG lawsuit to create a 
settlement with substantive protections. 
 
II. HOW SERVICERS ARE SHACKLING STUDENTS WITH HIGH DEBT 
While there has been an understandable concentration on 
mortgage loan servicing given the subprime mortgage crisis,38 student 
loans are quickly becoming just as pervasive of a problem in financial 
markets.39 This Article starts with the extra-legal problems in the 
market, which can be split into two categories: (1) the problems 
inherent in the average student borrower;40 and (2) servicing abuses 
that are a consequence of the ways in which loan servicers are 
compensated.41  
 
                                                            
37 See Kurt Eggert, Foreclosing on the Federal Power Grab: Dodd–Frank, 
Preemption, and the State Role in Mortgage Servicing Regulation, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 
171, 225 (2011) (“Given the lack of federal standards, and the go-ahead from 
Dodd–Frank, the best strategy by states could well be to plow forward with effective 
servicer regulation.”); see infra Section VI.D. 
38 See Gerald Korngold, Legal and Policy Choices in the Aftermath of the 
Subprime and Mortgage Financing Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 727 (2009), for an in-
depth review of the subprime mortgage crisis. 
39 See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text (discussing how student loan 
debt now surpasses all other forms of debt aside from mortgage debt and the domino 
effects that this is causing). 
40 See infra Section II.A. 
41 See infra Section II.B. 
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A. The Young, Uninformed, and Captive Consumer 
 
While the American financial system is premised on laissez-
faire economics, free choice only works to the extent that consumers 
are actually able to make their own “informed and rational” 
decisions.42 Unfortunately, many young Americans are not truly free 
in their choice of how to pay for college—roughly 60% of students 
take out loans to attend college each year,43 and higher education is 
essential to young Americans striving to obtain the American dream.44 
In fact, by 2018, 63% of new job openings will require at least some 
form of college education.45 Additionally, the cost of attending 
college keeps rising,46 forcing more students not only to take out 
loans, but also to take out more expensive loans. “From the academic 
year 2001-2002 to 2011-2012, the average total borrowing per student 
increased by 55%.”47 In 2014, students graduating from four-year 
institutions had an average debt of $29,400.48 The problems 
associated with student lending will only increase as this level of 
borrowing continues to grow.49  
Further, while many students are left without a choice in how 
to pay for college, many of those students also greatly overestimate 
                                                            
42 See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 19, at 7 (discussing how “freedom-of-
contract principle[s]” require an “informed and rational” consumer). 
43 Student Loan Debt Statistics, AM. STUDENT ASSISTANCE, 
http://www.asa.org/policy/resources/stats/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2013). 
44 Anthony P. Carnevale, Nicole Smith & Jeff Strohl, Help Wanted: Projections 
of Jobs and Education Requirements Through 2018, at 13 (2010), available at 
http://www9.georgetown.edu/grad/gppi/hpi/cew/pdfs/fullreport.pdf. 
45 Id. 
46 Defining Larger Participants of the Student Loan Servicing Market, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 73,383, 73,385 (Dec. 6, 2013) (citing,\ Trends in College Pricing 2012, COLL. 
BD. ADVOCACY & POLICY CTR., at 7 (2012), 
https://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/college-pricing-2012-full-
report_0.pdf) (stating that from 2000 to 2010, the average cost of attending a four-
year institution increased at a rate of 5.2% per year above the rate of inflation).  
47 Id. (citing Trends in College Pricing 2012, COLL. BD. ADVOCACY & POLICY 
CTR., at 4 (2012), https://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/college-pricing-
2012-full-report_0.pdf). 
48 Helping Struggling Federal Student Loan Borrowers Manage Their Debt, 79 
Fed. Reg. 33,843 (June 9, 2014). 
49 See Section II.B, for a discussion of the problems in the market. 
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their ability to repay their student loans.50 In one study, “over 50% of 
the [college freshman] overestimated their future income upon 
graduation.”51 This confidence is not surprising, considering many 
college students are young consumers52 and have not yet had the 
opportunity to learn from any other large financial transactions.53 
Students’ lack of choice in how to pay for college, their 
overestimation of their ability to repay debt, and their inexperience 
with large financial transactions leaves them uniquely vulnerable 
when they first encounter their student loan servicer.54 
 
B. Servicing Abuses  
The CFPB has done a commendable job in chronicling the 
issues prevalent in the student loan servicing market, mainly through 
the use of a specialized consumer complaint system.55 This system has 
                                                            
50 See Linda Simpson et al., College Debt: An Exploratory Study of Risk 
Factors Among College Freshmen, 42 J. STUDENT FIN. AID 16, 22 (2012), 
http://www.nasfaa.org/research/Journal/subs/College_Debt__An_Exploratory_Stud
y_of_Risk_Factors_Among_College_Freshmen.aspx. 
51 Id. 
52 Seventy-nine percent of college students in 2012 were between the ages 
eighteen and twenty-four. U.S. College Student Demographics in 2012, 
MARKETINGCHARTS.COM (Sept. 12, 2013), 
http://www.marketingcharts.com/wp/topics/demographics/us-college-student-
demographics-in-2012-36555/. 
53 See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 19, at 38 (discussing how because 
consumers enter into few mortgage contracts they have fewer opportunities to learn 
these large transactions than they do with smaller transactions like credit cards). In 
fact, one of the more troubling problems with high student loan debt is that students 
are not making large financial purchases, like houses, after graduating due to the 
high amount of debt they must still pay back on their student loans. Student Loan 
Affordability: Analysis of Public Input on Impact and Solutions, supra note 8, at 7-8; 
Farran Powell, Gen-Yers Delay First-Time Home Buying, YAHOO! FIN. (June 7, 
2013), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/gen-yers-delay-first-time-104900279.html. 
54 This vulnerability is much higher for students who took out student loans and 
did not complete college. See Susan Woodward, Consumer Confusion in the 
Mortgage Market 22 (2003), http://www.sandhill.com/pdf/consumer_confusion.pdf 
(finding that consumers with a college education saved an average of $1,500 on 
their mortgage by avoiding excessive mortgage broker fees). 
55 Lily Altavena, Consumer Protection Bureau Opens Student Loan Complaint 
System, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2012, 4:11 PM), 
http://thechoice.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/09/consumer-protection-bureau-opens-
student-loan-complaint-system/.  
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been instrumental in the CFPB documenting the widespread abuses 
prominent in the student loan servicing market.56 Overall, the abuses 
students reported to the CFPB can be broken down into two distinct 
types: (1) attempts by servicers to extend the length of time the 
student stays in repayment; and (2) servicers’ use of excessive 
ancillary fees.57  
1. Extending the Length of Repayment 
 
Servicers are likely intentionally committing abuses as a 
means to prolong the repayment process of students and thereby 
obtain additional tranches, or cuts, of each student’s repayments.58  For 
many private loans, servicers receive the first tranche in the form of a 
predetermined percentage of the unpaid principal balance on the loans 
that they service each month.59 Therefore, the longer the student stays 
in repayment, the longer the servicer can continue to collect this 
tranche.60 Unfortunately, the longer a student stays in repayment, the 
more interest accrues, increasing the amount that student will have to 
pay in the end.61 
Federal loan servicer compensation works in a slightly 
different manner.62 Servicers are compensated with a monthly flat 
rate, which depends upon the status of the loan.63 This rate shrinks for 
                                                            
56 Annual Report of the CFPB Student Loan Ombudsman, CONSUMER FIN. 
PROTECTION BUREAU 5 (2013), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201310_cfpb_student-loan-ombudsman-annual-
report.pdf. 
57 Id. at 2 (“Opaque or inaccurate payment processing [has] emerged as a 
significant trend in complaints.”). 
58 See infra notes 59-64.  
59 See Levitin & Twomey, supra note 13, at 37 (detailing the manner in which 
mortgage servicers are compensated). 
60 See id. at 38. 
61 Annual Report of the CFPB Student Loan Ombudsman, supra note 56, at 9-
10. 
62 Redacted Signed Great Lakes Contract Award, 
https://www.fbo.gov/index?tab=documents&tabmode=form&subtab=core&tabid=f
0b9abcbbad6bdddd83cc2be1a41e2de. 
63See, e.g., id. The CFPB estimated that the average amount was $1.68 per 
month per account. Defining Larger Participants of the Student Loan Servicing 
Market, 78 Fed. Reg. 73,383, 73,388 (Dec. 6, 2013) (citing Title IV Redacted 
Contract Awards 12-13, 
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a loan that goes into delinquency, but so long as the loan stays current, 
the servicer collects the largest amount possible under the contract 
each month.64 Therefore, even under this style of compensation, 
servicers have an incentive to keep loans in repayment status for a 
longer period of time, so they can continue to collect these payments. 
Even if the student’s loans slip into the lower-compensated tiers of 
delinquency and default, servicers can still charge students ancillary 
fees for falling behind on their payments to cover the difference in 
compensation tiers.65 
The abuses under this category are especially troubling 
because they often affect students who are simply trying to pay what 
they owe to their servicer.66 Students are frequently unable to find out 
from their servicers how payments are applied when paying more than 
the minimum amount due.67 Even if students explicitly instruct a 
servicer on how they want the extra payments applied, servicers often 
disregard the instructions.68 These practices can create an abuse 
because many students have more than one loan, and these loans can 
have more than one interest rate.69 Servicers who apply the 
overpayment to loans with lower interest rates end up increasing the 
overall amount that students will have to repay, as those loans with 
higher interest will have less of their principal paid down.70 This, in 
turn, will extend the overall time that these students will stay in 
debt.71 Doing so increases the number of tranches, or payments for 
federal loans, that services will ultimately collect, thereby increasing 
their bottom line at the expense of students.  
                                                            
https://www.fbo.gov/index?tab=documents&tabmode=form&subtab=core&tabid=f
0b9abcbbad6bdddd83cc2be1a41e2de (last visited Feb. 17, 2014)).  
64See, e.g., Redacted Signed Great Lakes Contract Award, 
https://www.fbo.gov/index?tab=documents&tabmode=form&subtab=core&tabid=f
0b9abcbbad6bdddd83cc2be1a41e2de (last visited Feb. 17, 2014). 
65 Levitin & Twomey, supra note 13, at 41. 
66 Annual Report of the CFPB Student Loan Ombudsman, supra note 56, at 8-
11. 
67 Id. at 8. 
68 Id. at 9-10. 
69 Id. at 9.  
70 Id. at 9-10. 
71 Id. 
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2. Ancillary Fee Add-On 
 
 The second major issue student borrowers face is that servicers 
are engaging in certain practices to rack up the number of ancillary 
fees that student borrowers pay.72 Ancillary fees are “late fees . . . and 
fees for any costs involved in collection.”73 Often, servicers are 
allowed to keep all ancillary fees collected from the borrower.74 
Therefore, servicers frequently have an incentive to play “add-on,” so 
to speak, and charge students as many ancillary fees as possible.75   
In situations where students do not have enough money to pay 
their minimum amount due and instead attempt to pay a smaller 
amount, rather than paying nothing at all,76 students encountered 
servicers who misapplied their payments.77 In these situations, 
servicers applied this underpayment by splitting it up so that none of 
the student’s loans had the minimum amount due paid.78 By doing so, 
students faced a late fee on each and every loan, even though the 
servicer could have applied the payments in such a way that the 
minimum amount due was paid on at least some of the student’s 
loans.79  
Students also reported that they were making payments before 
the due date but the payments were processed afterwards, leading to 
late fees.80 Check payments would often be inexplicably lost in the 
mail.81 Student loan servicers also frequently gave students inaccurate 
pay-off information.82 Therefore, students who attempted to pay off 
their entire outstanding debt were often told their debt was one 
amount when the amount was a little more.83 Students did not find out 
that their loan had not been paid off until the loan went into 
                                                            
72 See Annual Report of the CFPB Student Loan Ombudsman, supra note 56, at 
11-14. 
73 Levitin & Twomey, supra note 13, at 41. 
74 See id. 
75 See id. 
76 The CFPB calls these “good faith payments.” Annual Report of the CFPB 
Student Loan Ombudsman, supra note 56, at 11-12. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 13. 
81 Id. at 14. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
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delinquency or default.84 This practice again resulted in servicers 
charging late fees for the number of payments missed.85 
Students encountered numerous problems when their loans 
were transferred from one servicer to another.86 Students usually have 
no control over servicer transfers, which are decisions made by the 
holder of the loan.87 The most common problem that students whose 
loans were transferred to a different servicer faced was a lack of 
notice.88 This lack of adequate notice led both to students paying their 
old servicer and students paying in a payment method that, while 
accepted by their previous servicer, was not accepted by their new 
servicer.89 Both of these mistakes led to students being charged 
ancillary fees.90 Moreover, when loans were transferred from one 
servicer to another, student borrowers reported that they were placed 
into the wrong repayment plan.91 One especially disconcerting 
observation is that transfer problems are exceedingly prevalent with 
loans originating through the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan 
Program.92  
Another troubling problem is that many of these inappropriate 
fees are likely never discovered.93 In mortgage servicing, 
inappropriate ancillary fees charged by servicers have often only been 
discovered in bankruptcy hearings, at which point they have been 
challenged.94 However, student loans cannot be discharged through 
                                                            
84 Id. For federal student loans, delinquency starts from the first day that a 
payment is missed until the borrower defaults, and default occurs once a student has 
missed payments for either 270 or 330 days, depending upon under what program 
the student borrowed. Don’t Ignore Your Student Loan Payments or You’ll Risk 
Going into Default, FED. STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/default 
(last visited Feb. 17, 2014). Additionally, servicers report all delinquencies of over 
90 days to the three major credit reporters. Id. 
85 Annual Report of the CFPB Student Loan Ombudsman, supra note 56, at 14.  
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Defining Larger Participants of the Student Loan Servicing Market, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 73,383, 73,386 (Dec. 6, 2013). 
92 Id. This could be described as the equivalent of government-sanctioned 
abuse.  
93 See infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.   
94 Levitin & Twomey, supra note 13, at 44. 
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bankruptcy unless the student can show undue hardship,95 which is a 
monumentally high standard that few borrowers can meet.96 Often, 
students must face a debilitating mental or physical impairment or 
other extreme hardship for the courts to discharge their student loan 
debt.97 This high standard likely deters borrowers from even 
attempting to discharge their student loans through a bankruptcy 
hearing, leaving many of these potentially abusive ancillary fees 
undiscovered. Worse, some servicers are affirmatively lying to 
student borrowers by telling them that their loans are not 
dischargeable in bankruptcy at all.98 However, even if students do 
notice such fees, they must sill jump through a myriad of hoops to 
protect themselves.99  
 
III. ATTEMPTS AT CONSUMER SELF-PROTECTION 
 
The susceptible characteristics of the student borrower coupled 
with the abuses perpetrated by student loan services create a wrong 
that demands a solution.100 However, in many such scenarios the 
                                                            
95 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012). 
96 Brendan Baker, Deeper Debt, Denial of Discharge: The Harsh Treatment of 
Student Loan Debt in Bankruptcy, Recent Developments, and Proposed Reforms, 14 
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1213, 1214 (2012) (calling student loans “virtually impossible to 
discharge in bankruptcy”); Mark Kantrowitz, Congress Proposes Allowing Private 
Student Loans to Be Discharged in Bankruptcy, FASTWEB (Apr. 22, 2010), http:// 
www.fastweb.com/financial-aid/articles/2259-congress-proposes-allowing-private-
student-loans-to-be-discharged-in-bankruptcy (finding that only twenty-nine 
borrowers in bankruptcy in 2008 were able to have their student-loan debt 
discharged). 
97 Bronsdon v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Bronsdon), 435 B.R. 791, 799 
(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2010) (“Many courts . . . place dispositive weight on the debtor’s 
ability to demonstrate ‘additional extraordinary circumstances’ that establish a 
‘certainty of hopelessness.’ This has led some courts to require that the debtor show 
the existence of ‘unique’ or ‘extraordinary’ circumstances, such as the debtor’s 
advanced age, illness or disability, psychiatric problems, lack of usable job skills, 
large number of dependents or severely limited education.”) (quoting Hicks v. Educ. 
Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hicks), 331 B.R. 18, 27-28 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005)). 
98 Supervisory Highlights, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU 17 (Fall 
2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201410_cfpb_supervisory-highlights_fall-
2014.pdf  (“CFPB examiners found one or more supervised entities that were 
misrepresenting to consumers that student loans are never dischargeable in 
bankruptcy.”). 
99 See infra Part III.   
100 See supra Part II. 
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traditional claims in contract common law have proven insufficient.101 
Due to the extreme difference in power between loan servicers and 
student borrowers, this is an ideal field for consumer law to provide 
students with greater protections than what are normally available.102 
However, private enforcement of consumer protection statutes still 
presents many of the same obstacles, including a lack of privity 
between the servicer and the student, the reluctance of courts to find 
that a servicing contract constitutes an assignment, and the limited 
knowledge of and lack of incentive for most students to pursue a 
claim. 
Historically, a borrower’s only recourse against potentially 
abusive or deceptive consumer financial practices was the common 
law.103 However, common law claims quickly became inadequate to 
handle the complex and rapidly changing financial industry.104 The 
most applicable common law protections to students who face issues 
with their student loan servicer are the contract doctrines of breach 
and unconscionability.105 The doctrine of unconscionability allows 
courts to not only strike certain terms in contracts, but also to cancel 
entire contracts if they “shock the conscience and are the product of a 
flawed bargaining procedure.”106 However, courts have been very 
reluctant to use this doctrine in consumer financial transactions.107  
Instead of asserting an unconscionability claim against an 
originator, borrowers could attempt to assert a breach-of-contract 
                                                            
101 Totten, supra note 28, at 119. 
102 See Michael S. Greve, Consumer Law, Class Actions, and the Common Law, 
7 CHAP. L. REV. 155, 157 (2004) (discussing how consumer law attempts to provide 
consumers greater protections because of “asymmetric information (or wholesale 
consumer ignorance), unequal bargaining power, and irrational consumer 
preferences”). (citing Lary Lawrence, Toward a More Efficient and Just Economy: 
An Argument for Limited Enforcement of Consumer Promises, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 815, 
817, 824-25 (1987)). 
103 Totten, supra note 28, at 119. 
104 Id. 
105 See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 19, at 71. 
106 Id. (citing ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28 (3d ed.1999)). Students 
could make the argument that their contract with the originator is unconscionable 
because the contract contains several terms that could shock the conscience, 
including free assignability and the ability for any servicer to charge exorbitant 
ancillary fees. Students could also argue that the process by which the contract was 
negotiated was deeply flawed in that the loan originator held all of the power over 
the student, forcing them to sign a contract of adhesion. See supra Part II. 
107 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 19, at 71. 
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claim against the servicer for failing to apply payments properly and 
timely, or for failing to give proper notice of a servicing transfer, or 
for whatever other abuses the servicer might have perpetrated. One 
issue with this strategy is that the contract might not forbid such 
practices, even though such practices could be considered abusive, 
deceptive, or unfair.108 The bigger issue with this strategy is the lack 
of privity between the student borrower and the servicer.109 Because 
the servicer contracts with the lender, and not the borrower, it is the 
lender that is in privity with the servicer.110 Therefore, a consumer’s 
claim against a servicer will likely fail, as the contractual relationship 
between the two “clearly does not support [a] breach of contract claim 
given the lack of privity between the servicer and the [borrower].”111 
Instead, only lenders can hold servicers accountable.112 These 
lenders, however, often lack the necessary incentives to pursue an 
action because any action taken would likely adversely affect their 
bottom line.113 The complexity of an added party in financial 
transactions has created a problem where “there is no party with the 
ability and incentive to monitor a servicer’s actions,” leaving students 
slaves to the actions of servicers.114  
Some scholars argue that the problems inherent in the average 
student borrower further contribute to this lack of a principal–agent 
relationship because many borrowers do not know that they should be 
able to bargain over to whom the loan can be assigned.115 While 
                                                            
108 See infra Section VI.C (discussing the desirability of the CFPB defining 
these acts or practices as such). 
109 See Levitin & Twomey, supra note 13, at 81-83. 
110 Id. 
111 Griffin v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing (In re Griffin), No. 10-22431-RDD, 
2010 WL 3928610, at *7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2010) (holding that a mortgage 
servicer is not in contractual privity with a mortgagor, and that therefore, a claim of 
a breach of contract could not go forward).  
112 Levitin & Twomey, supra note 13, at 81. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. If it is, in fact, an assignment that is at issue. See infra notes and 120-123 
and accompanying text (discussing how the designation of a servicing contract as an 
assignment is likely missing the mark). According to BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(9th ed. 2009), an assignor is “[o]ne who transfers property rights or powers to 
another.” Of course, an assignor can always transfer only part of his or her interests 
or powers. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009), assignment (defining partial 
assignment as “[t]he immediate transfer of part but not all of the assignor’s right”). 
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certainly interesting, bargaining over a servicer is likely only possible 
in the context of mortgages and private student loans. Newly 
originated federal student loans are assigned only to certain pre-
approved servicers: Title IV Additional Servicers (TIVAS).116 
Therefore, if the government has not contracted with a certain 
servicer, pursuant to Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, 
then the student cannot bargain to have that servicer service their 
loan.117 Further, after the government measures a servicer’s 
performance in a variety of areas, federal loans are contracted out to 
these servicers without any input from the affected student 
borrower.118 Therefore, bargaining over servicers would likely only 
help the small percentage of student borrowers who take out private 
loans.119  
More importantly, having students negotiate over their 
servicers, which has been discussed in terms of assignability,120 raises 
an important issue because the designation of a servicing contract as 
an assignment might be missing the mark. If the loan was being 
assigned to a servicer, then privity would be created between the 
borrower and the servicer, allowing them to assert any common law 
or statutory claims they might have against a servicer.121 Yet, federal 
courts have held that the servicing of loans does not constitute an 
assignment.122 The courts deciding so follow a rather straightforward 
                                                            
116 Defining Larger Participants of the Student Loan Servicing Market, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 73,383, 73,386 (Dec. 6, 2013) (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1071-81 (2012)).  
117 Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1071-81).  
118 DiGangi, supra note 15. These areas include “default rates by number of 
loans and by dollar value, and the combination of their customer satisfaction and 
default rankings[.]” Id.; see Section VI.B, for a discussion on granting students the 
ability to pick their own servicer from the pre-approved TIVASs. 
119 The CFPB estimates that TIVASs “account for between approximately 67 to 
87% of activity in the market.” Defining Larger Participants of the Student Loan 
Servicing Market, 78 Fed. Reg. 73,383, 73,387 (June 9, 2014). Further, the Bureau 
estimates that federal student loans account for more than 90% of all new student 
loans. Id. at 73,388. 
120 See Levitin & Twomey, supra note 13, at 83 (“If homeowners were worried 
about servicing risk, they would bargain over assignability.”). 
121 Assignments, USLegal.com, assignments.uslegal.com, (last visited July 28, 
2014) (citing Merchs. Servs. Co. v. Small Claims Court, 25 Cal. 2d 109, 113 (Cal. 
1950)).  
122 See e.g., Short v. Wells Fargo Bank Minn., 401 F. Supp. 2d 549, 563 
(S.D.W. Va. 2005); Wile v. Green Tree Servicing, No. Civ.A. 04-2866, 2004 WL 
2644390, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2004). 
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Truth in Lending Act provision, which explicitly states that “a 
servicer . . . shall not be treated as an assignee.”123 
In a 2013 Ohio Supreme Court case, Anderson v. Barclay’s 
Capital Real Estate, Inc.,124 the Court held that Ohio’s consumer 
protection statute did not protect consumers from the practices of 
servicers. The Court made two important holdings on the definition of 
a consumer transaction under the state consumer protection statute.125 
First, the Court held that mortgage servicers do not provide a service 
to the consumer but instead provide a service to the mortgage note 
holder.126 This holding echoes the principal–agent issue confronting 
borrowers, and prevents students from bringing claims under both the 
common law and Ohio’s consumer protection statute.127 Second, the 
Court held—without any discussion—that a servicing contract 
between a lender and a servicer does not constitute an assignment.128 
Since the servicing of a student loan does not constitute an 
                                                            
123 15 U.S.C. § 1641(f) (2006). 
124 Anderson v. Barclay’s Capital Real Estate, Inc., 136 Ohio St. 3d 31, 2013-
Ohio-1933, 989 N.E.2d 997, at ¶¶ 15-17, 29-32 (holding that mortgage servicing is 
not a consumer transaction that the Ohio Consumer Sales Protection Act covers and 
that servicers are not suppliers within the Act’s definition).  
125 Id. ¶¶ 15-17. Ohio’s consumer protection statute defines a consumer 
transaction to be “a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance, or other transfer of an 
item of goods, a service, a franchise, or an intangible, to an individual for purposes 
that are primarily personal, family or household.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
1345.01(A) (West 2013) (emphasis added).  
126 Anderson, 136 Ohio St. 3d 31, 2013-Ohio-1933, 989 N.E.2d 997, at ¶¶ 15-
17. 
127 Levitin & Twomey, supra note 13, at 83. Additionally, this first holding is 
extremely important to the enforcement of Ohio’s Consumer Sales Protection Act. 
See infra notes 180-181 and accompanying text (discussing how this holding affects 
the ability of the Ohio Attorney General to bring consumer protection claims against 
loan servicers). While Section IV.B only discusses SAG enforcement of state 
consumer protection statutes, the applicability of these statutes is the same 
regardless of a suit brought by a SAG or by a student borrower.  
128 The Court simply states that “in the servicing of a real estate mortgage, one 
essential element of R.C. 1345.01(A) is not met: there is no sale, lease, assignment, 
award by chance or other transfer of a service to a consumer.” Anderson, 136 Ohio 
St. 3d 31, 2013-Ohio-1933, 989 N.E.2d 997, at ¶ 15 (emphasis added) (citing OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.01(A)). Additionally, the Court made a third holding, 
which was their second explicit holding, that is important to the application of 
Ohio’s consumer protection statute, but need not be expounded upon here. Id. ¶¶ 29-
32 (holding that servicers were not suppliers within the meaning of Ohio’s 
consumer protection statute). 
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assignment, the student lacks any sort of legal relationship with the 
servicer to bring a common law claim or an unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices (UDAP) claim under state consumer protection laws that 
require this relationship, such as Ohio.129 While state UDAP 
prohibitions will be expounded upon at greater length in the 
discussion of SAG enforcement of these laws,130 it will suffice for 
now to say that state UDAP prohibitions are roughly the equivalent of 
their federal UDAAP analogue.131 
However, even if students had the ability to hold servicers 
accountable through lawsuits, as they do in some states,132 the issue of 
the uninformed and overly optimistic consumer remains.133 First, 
students may not notice a servicer’s inappropriate acts or practices, or 
the fees servicers charged.134 Should students even notice a charge, 
they are unlikely to have the motivation to challenge what will, in all 
probability, only be a small fee.135 However, just one improper $15 
late fee assessed to 7,000 loans results in the servicer receiving an 
additional $105,000 in revenue,136 and a consumer has no way of 
knowing if these fees are systemic in nature.137 Therefore, these 
obstacles make student-initiated consumer protection under either the 
framework of the common law or state consumer protection statutes 
an inadequate remedy for the abuses perpetrated by servicers.138  
Instead, both the CFPB and SAGs have large consumer 
complaint databases, which are able to document any systemic illegal 
practices by student loan servicers.139 Therefore, these entities—in 
                                                            
129 See infra notes 190-193 and accompanying text (discussing the states which 
interpret their statutes in the same way as Ohio).  
130 See infra notes 168-173 and accompanying text. 
131 For an in-depth discussion on UDAP laws and how they differ from the 
federal UDAAP law see infra notes 252-257. 
132 See infra notes 182-188 and accompanying text. 
133 See supra Section II.A.   
134 Levitin & Twomey, supra note 13, at 43. 
135 Id. Consumers have little incentive to “haggl[e] over . . . $15 or even 
$1,000.” See id. (discussing the unlikelihood of consumers bringing actions for 
small amounts of money once a mortgage is in default). 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 This proposition is applicable both to common law claims, which were 
discussed in depth in this Section, and state law UDAP claims, which are discussed 
more in depth in Section IV.B in the context of SAG enforcement of these laws. 
139 Totten, supra note 28, at 160-61. 
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cooperation with one another—must be the ones to lead the charge in 
the battle for greater financial consumer protection.140 Unfortunately, 
SAGs have historically been frustrated in their attempts to provide 
greater accountability in the servicing market.141 This has led to a 
long-existing lack of regulation of loan servicers.142 
 
IV. THE HISTORY OF THE LOAN SERVICING MARKET: REGULATION 
AND THE LACK THEREOF 
 Legal scholarship on loan servicing has focused largely on the 
issues in the mortgage servicing market.143 Throughout the history of 
the mortgage servicing market, there has been a great deal of 
confusion as to which federal agency should regulate this market.144 
In fact, when the 2008 financial crisis occurred, “regulators seemed 
almost mystified as to who regulated mortgage servicers and how 
servicers should be regulated.”145 Prior to and during the crisis, many 
states attempted to fill the gap left by the uncertainty in federal 
oversight.146 However, they were often preempted by federal 
regulators who were responsible for the financial soundness of many 
of these servicers as financial institutions and saw servicer regulation 
as a threat to these institutions’ bottom lines.147  
                                                            
140 Id. at 161 (“In addition to sharing information, the states and the CFPB can 
also partner to analyze and respond to consumer-complaint information in a manner 
that is more efficient and effective than would be possible through individual efforts 
alone.”). 
141 See infra notes 164-166 and accompanying text.  
142 See infra Part IV.  
143 Although this Article will briefly discuss some of the issues in the mortgage-
servicing market and the steps taken to remedy them, more complete discussions 
can be found in Aleatra P. Williams, Foreclosing Foreclosure: Escaping the 
Yawning Abyss of the Deep Mortgage and Housing Crisis, 7 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 
455 (2012), and Levitin & Twomey, supra note 13.  
144 Eggert, supra note 37, at 172. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 172-73. 
147 Id. 
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A. The Federal History of Inaction 
Prior to the changes of the Dodd–Frank Act,148 the federal 
regulatory scheme was fragmented.149 The Office of the Comptroller 
of Currency (OCC) regulated national banks.150 The Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) regulated state banks that are not a part 
of the Federal Reserve.151  The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) 
regulated federal savings associations and state-chartered banks that 
are a part of the Federal Reserve.152  Finally, the National Credit 
Union Administration (NCUA) regulated both federal- and state-
chartered credit unions.153 However, in the years leading up to the 
mortgage crisis, federal regulators rarely pursued enforcement actions 
against the financial companies they regulated.154 From 1995 to 2007, 
the OCC did not issue “a public enforcement order against any of the 
eight largest national banks.”155 In the end, all this federal oversight 
did little more than “create[] a degree of friction with state law, which 
[has] historically dominated the field of consumer protection.”156 
The lack of oversight can be largely attributed to two causes. 
First, federal regulators lacked incentives to bring enforcement actions 
against these institutions157 because these regulators were not only 
responsible for the oversight of these institutions, but also for these 
institutions’ financial soundness.158 Second, these regulatory agencies 
were compensated partly based on the number of institutions they 
                                                            
148 The changes made under this Act are explored in Part V. 
149 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 19, at 86 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Credit Card Practices: Current Consumer and Regulatory Issues: Hearing 
before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. 
Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. 70 (2007) (written testimony of Arthur E. 
Wilmarth, Jr., Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School) 
[hereinafter Wilmarth Testimony]. 
155 Id. 
156 JOHN A. SPANOGLE, JR. ET AL., CONSUMER LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
163 (4th ed. 2013). 
157 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 19, at 90.  
158 Id. (“These agencies are designed with a primary mission to protect the 
safety and soundness of the banking system. This means protecting banks’ 
profitability. Consumer protection is, at best, a lesser priority.”). 
Cox Article.docx (Do Not Delete)  3/9/15  5:45 PM 
2015 The Student Borrower 209 
regulated, and the institutions themselves were often free to choose 
their own regulators.159 This compensation scheme resulted in a “race 
to the bottom, where the banking agencies sought to increase market 
share by minimizing consumer protections.”160 Therefore, these 
regulators had no incentive to enforce any consumer protection law 
because it might have affected the entity’s profitability and, if the 
entity’s consequently decided to change regulators, shrink the budgets 
of those regulatory agencies.161 This left a gaping hole in the 
regulatory oversight of financial products.162 
 
B. State Gap Filling and the Importance of a Dual-Enforcement 
Regime 
Eventually, states attempted to fill this gap.163 However,   
federal regulators’ most destructive practice in the years leading up to 
the mortgage crisis was the preemption of state attempts to enforce 
state consumer protection laws.164 In several instances, regulators 
preempted states that brought enforcement actions,165 but, instead of 
taking up the action themselves, the regulators often simply dropped 
any and all claims against the financial institutions.166 This pattern of 
preemption and non-enforcement led Illinois Attorney General Lisa 
Madigan to recognize that “a dual state-federal regulatory regime . . . 
is vital to the health of our economy.”167 
Beginning in the 1960s, recognizing the growing complexity 
of consumer financial transactions, both federal and state governments 
began to pass statutory protections for consumers.168 The most 
important were those banning UDAPs.169 While the UDAP 
prohibition started as a federal regulation enforced by the Federal 
                                                            
159 Id. at 93-95. 
160 Totten supra note 28, at 125. 
161 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 19, at 90-95. 
162 At the very least, it created significant “cracks” in the regulatory scheme. 
Totten, supra note 28, at 122-25. 
163 Id. at 123-24. 
164 Id., at 123-25.  
165 See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 19, at 91-93.  
166 See id. at 91-92 (detailing a specific case of preemption in California 
involving the OCC). 
167 Madigan Testimony, supra note 31, at 4. 
168 Totten, supra note 28, at 119-20. 
169 Id. 
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Trade Commission (FTC), the states soon adopted their own UDAP 
prohibitions in their respective consumer protection statutes and gave 
their citizens a private right of action under the protection— 
something which the federal statute lacked.170 Now, all fifty states 
have at least some prohibition against deceptive acts.171 However, 
these laws have varying degrees of strength and applicability.172 Most 
states attempted to use these UDAP statutes to “regulate” consumer 
financial products through litigation.173 While these laws provide for 
private causes of action,174 there are still significant obstacles to 
private enforcement.175 Instead, SAGs, with their expansive resources 
and consumer complaint databases, are in a better position to enforce 
these laws176 against the widespread abuses that students have 
reported.177 
However, SAG enforcement of state UDAP provisions faces 
its own challenges. As discussed, a recent Ohio Supreme Court 
decision, Anderson v. Barclay’s Capital Real Estate, Inc., neutered 
that state’s consumer protection statute as applied to loan servicers.178 
This would apply whether a private litigant or that State’s Attorney 
General brought the action because in either case there would be no 
contractual relationship between borrower and servicer, which is a 
prerequisite to that state’s consumer protection statute.179 The Ohio 
Attorney General participated in the litigation as an amicus curiae, 
arguing that Ohio’s consumer protection statute covered loan 
                                                            
170 Id. 
171 Carolyn L. Carter, Consumer Protection in the States: A 50 State Report on 
Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices Statutes, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CENTER 
(2009), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/report_50_states.pdf. 
172 See generally id. (discussing the strength and scope of all fifty states’ UDAP 
prohibitions). 
173 Raymond H. Brescia, Leverage: State Enforcement Actions in the Wake of 
the Robo-Sign Scandal, 64 ME. L. REV. 17, 30 (2011) (“Across the nation, state 
attorneys general have filed a number of high profile actions under state UDAP laws 
and other consumer protection statutes against lenders active in the subprime 
mortgage market over the last decade. Several high profile cases have resulted in 
sweeping settlements that resulted in the payment of penalties and attorneys fees, 
and forced lenders to reform their lending practices.” (emphasis added)). 
174 Totten, supra note 28, at 121. 
175 See supra Part III. 
176 See supra notes 139-140 and accompanying text. 
177 See supra Section II.B. 
178 See supra notes 124-128 and accompanying text. 
179 Id. 
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servicers, as they provided a service to the borrower.180 The Court 
disagreed and held that a servicer was not providing a service to the 
consumer but to the lender.181 
While Anderson is the most recent decision regarding state 
UDAP statutes’ applicability to lender–servicer–borrower 
relationships, and one of the few decided by a state court, various 
(albeit few) courts have weighed in on the issue, construing other state 
UDAP provisions. Some courts have indicated that different states’ 
UDAP provisions would apply to loan servicers. These states include 
California,182 Connecticut,183 Florida,184 New Jersey,185 
Massachusetts,186 Pennsylvania,187 South Dakota,188 and 
Washington.189 However, other jurisdictions have taken a stance 
                                                            
180 Merit Brief of Amicus Curiae State of Ohio in Support of Respondent 
Sondra Anderson, Anderson v. Barclay’s Capital Real Estate, Inc., 136 Ohio St. 3d 
31, 2013-Ohio-1933, 989 N.E.2d 997 (No. 3:09-cv-02335-JGC).  
181 Anderson, 989 N.E.2d 997, at 1001.  
182 Young v. Wells Fargo, 671 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1024-25 (S.D. Iowa 2009) 
(construing CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17210 (West 2008)).   
183 Brooks v. Salle Mae, Inc., No. FSTCV096002530S, 2011 WL 6989888, at 
*7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2011) (construing CONN. GEN STAT. §§ 42-110a–
110q (2010)). This decision is also the only decision cited here that expressly 
involves student loan servicers as opposed to mortgage services. The decision is 
particularly important and is discussed in more detail later. See infra notes 222, 228 
and accompanying text. 
184 In re G-Fees Antitrust Litigation, 584 F. Supp. 2d 26, 42-43 (D.D.C. 2008) 
(construing FLA. STAT. § 501.204(1) (2007)) (explaining the change in Florida’s 
consumer protection statute that now allows suits by anyone affected by a violation 
instead of only those in a direct contractual relationship with the violating party).  
185 Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 25 A.3d 1103, 1115-17 (N.J. 2011) 
(construing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (West 2010)). In New Jersey the statute is 
interpreted broadly using three main elements as a guidepost to applicability: “(1) an 
unlawful practice, (2) an ‘ascertainable loss,’ and (3) ‘a causal relationship between 
the unlawful conduct and the ascertainable loss.’” Id. (quoting Lee v. Carter-Reed 
Co., 4 A.3d 561, 576 (N.J. 2010)). 
186 Hart v. GMAC Mortg. Corp. & Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n (In re Hart), 246 
B.R. 709, 733-37 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2000) (construing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 
2(a) (1999)). 
187 Vassalotti v. Wells Fargo Bank, 732 F. Supp. 2d 503, 510-511 (E.D. Penn. 
2010) (construing 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 201-2(4)(xxi) (2009)). 
188 Young v. Wells Fargo, 671 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1032-33 (S.D. Iowa 2009) 
(construing S.D. CODIFIED Laws § 37-24-6 (2008)). 
189 Birkholm v. Washington Mut. Bank, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1165-66 (W.D. 
Wash. 2006) (construing WASH REV. CODE § 19.86.020 (2005)) (“To prove a 
violation of the CPA, a claimant must show: (1) an unfair or deceptive act; (2) the 
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similar to Ohio and concluded that their consumer protection statutes 
do not reach loan servicers. These jurisdictions include the District of 
Columbia,190 Minnesota,191 Texas,192 and Virginia.193  
While this issue has not been explicitly litigated in the 
remaining states, four additional states have consumer protection 
statutes that explicitly exempt the credit industry194—Louisiana, 
Michigan, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island.195 Therefore, these 
states’ UDAP provisions are also inapplicable in the lender–servicer–
borrower relationship.196 Further, Oregon’s statute does not apply to 
consumer lending.197 Therefore, at least nine states (Louisiana, 
Michigan, Maine, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
                                                            
act occurred in the conduct of trade or commerce; (3) the act has an impact on the 
public interest; (4) injury to the claimant; and (5) causation.” (emphasis added) 
(citing Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 531, 
532-33. (Wash. 1986)). Therefore, under the Washington statute the courts look 
more at the effect of the potentially unfair or deceptive act or practice than at the 
relationship between the two parties. See id. 
190 In re G-Fees Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 26, 42-43 (D.D.C. 2008) 
(construing D.C. CODE §§ 28-3901–3913 (2007) (holding that mortgagors are not 
consumers of mortgage servicers, and that therefore, the D.C. consumer protection 
statute does not apply). 
191 Rossbach v. FBS Mortg. Corp., Nos. C3-97-1622, C9-97-1852, 1998 WL 
156303, at *2-3 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 1998) (construing MINN. STAT. §§ 325F.68-
70 (1996)) (concluding that a mortgage servicer was not covered by the Minnesota 
consumer protection statute because the servicer did not provide a service to the 
consumer and because the servicer did not offer merchandise to the consumer). 
192 Rico v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 3:10-CV-1643-L, 2011 WL 1792854 at 
*4-5 (N.D. Tex. May 10, 2011) (construing TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45 
(West 2010)) (holding that mortgagors were not consumers of loan servicing 
because servicing was only incidental to the reason for the consumer transaction: 
purchasing a house). 
193 In re G-Fees Anti-Trust Litigation, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 43 (construing VA. 
CODE ANN. § 59.1-200) (holding that neither Fannie Mae nor Freddie Mac provides 
mortgagors with any good or service, and therefore, cannot be held liable under the 
Virginia consumer protection statute); Salehi v. Wells Fargo, No. 1:11-cv-1323, 
2012 WL 2119333 at *5-6 (E.D. Va. June 11, 2012). 
194 See Carter, supra note 171, at 14. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. (“Despite the overwhelming problem of predatory and abusive lending, 
five states—Louisiana, Michigan, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Virginia—
immunize all or almost all lenders and creditors from the UDAP statute, regardless 
of the unfair or deceptive nature of their practices.”). 
197 Id. at 31 n.15 (citing Haeger v. Johnson, 548 P.2d 532 (Or. Ct. App. 1976)). 
However, the issue has never made it to the Oregon Supreme Court. Id. 
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Texas, and Virginia) and the District of Columbia cannot enforce their 
UDAP provisions against student loan servicers.198 This number is 
likely a low estimate, as many states have exemptions for banks and 
for entities overseen by a regulator.199 Moreover, the states that have 
UDAPs that cover mortgage loan servicers may face a field-
preemption problem when attempting to apply these statutes to 
student loan servicers.200 Therefore, it is possible that no state truly 
has the power to hold servicers accountable for abusing students; the 
issue of federal preemption as applied to student loan servicing will be 
discussed shortly.201 
While in the past states were largely preempted when it came 
to holding mortgage servicers accountable,202 there were some 
successes. The most important achievement was a $25 billion 
settlement paid by mortgage servicers to all fifty SAGs.203 This 
settlement was the culmination of a year-long investigation led by 
SAGs.204 This one-time settlement, while certainly helpful, is less 
useful than the powers SAGs had before federal regulators preempted 
their consumer protection authority.205 However, there are some very 
interesting aspects to this settlement, including substantive 
requirements for mortgage servicers and the appointment of a monitor 
to ensure that these requirements are met—truly a great example of 
regulation through litigation.206  
                                                            
198 See supra notes 181, 190-197 and accompanying text. 
199 Carter, supra note 171, at 13-14. 
200 See infra notes 222-228 and accompanying text. 
201 Id. 
202 Eggert, supra note 37, at 207-13. 
203 See id. at 216; State Attorneys General, Feds Reach $25 Billion Settlement 
with Five Largest Mortgage Servicers on Foreclosure Wrongs, NAT’L ASS’N. 
ATTORNEYS GEN., http://www.naag.org/medianaag/media/naag-news/state-
attorneys-general-feds-reach-25-billion-settlement-with-five-largest-mortgage-
servicers-on-foreclosure-
wrongs.php?searched=Feds+Reach+%2425+Billion&advsearch=allwords&highligh
t=ajaxSearch_highlight+ajaxSearch_highlight1+ajaxSearch_highlight2+ajaxSearch
_highlight3+ajaxSearch_highlight4 (last visited Feb. 18, 2014) . 
204 David McLaughlin & Tom Schoenberg, Foreclosure Settlement with Banks 
Filed in Federal Court, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Mar. 12, 2012, 6:40 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-12/u-s-mortgage-foreclosure-settlement-
with-banks-filed-in-federal-court.html. 
205 Wilmarth Testimony, supra note 154, at 79. 
206 State Attorneys General, Feds Reach $25 Billion Settlement with Five 
Largest Mortgage Servicers on Foreclosure Wrongs, supra note 203. 
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Therefore, while individual SAG actions against student loan 
servicers might be successful, many states would likely still have 
issues enforcing their consumer protection statutes due to the varying 
applicability of each state’s statutes.207 Instead, the answer must come 
from either greater federal oversight, which enables states to act as a 
second line of defense,208 or SAG teamwork in a coordinated effort 
similar to that of the national mortgage settlement.209 Fortunately, the 
federal government has taken greater notice of the issues in the 
financial consumer protection market in the past several years.210  
 
V. A NEW FEDERAL REGULATORY SCHEME: THE DODD–FRANK 
ACT AND OTHER OBAMA ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS 
After the subprime mortgage bubble burst and we entered an 
economic recession, the federal government slowly realized that the 
old regulatory scheme did not work.211 Therefore, the government 
made several changes to the scheme, most importantly the Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank 
Act).212 Included in these reforms were some very important changes 
for state financial consumer protection enforcement, specifically a 
statutory presumption against preemption of state consumer protection 
laws.213 Further, the Act created the CFPB and gave it rulemaking 
authority over certain consumer financial markets.214 Specific to 
student loan servicing, on June 9, 2014, the Obama Administration 
issued a presidential memorandum, regarding abuses in student loan 
servicing, and the Department of Education announced that it would 
be renegotiating its contracts with student loan servicers.215 
                                                            
207 See supra notes 181-197 and accompanying text. 
208 See infra Section VI.C. 
209 See infra Section VI.D. 
210 See infra Part V. However, even these changes are not sufficient to defeat 
the abuses of the student loan servicing market. See infra Section VI.A. 
211 Totten, supra note 28, at 122-25 (discussing the “cracks in the foundation” 
of the old consumer finance regulatory regime). 
212 Id. at 125-28.  
213 Id. at 128 (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 5551(d), 5587 (2012)). Therefore, “federal 
law is [now] a floor, not a ceiling.” Id.; see also infra Section V.A. 
214 See infra Section V.B. 
215 See infra Section V.C. 
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A. Statutory Changes 
Procedurally, many scholars believe that the presumption 
against preemption in Title X of the Dodd–Frank Act is one of the 
most important fixes to federal consumer protection regulation since 
the subprime mortgage crisis.216 Under this presumption, the Dodd–
Frank Act preempts only those state laws that are inconsistent with it, 
and those laws are preempted only to the extent that they are 
inconsistent with the Act.217 Further, state laws that provide additional 
protections to consumers are not inconsistent.218 Additionally, the Act 
mostly eliminates federal banking regulators’ claims that their 
oversight field preempts any state attempts at regulation.219 
[I]nstead [it] provides that state consumer financial 
laws are preempted by national banks, thrift laws, and 
regulations only in three circumstances: (1) if the state 
consumer financial law would have a “discriminatory 
effect on national banks” compared to state chartered 
banks, (2) if “in accordance with the legal standard for 
preemption in the decision of the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Barnett Bank . . . the State consumer 
financial law prevents or significantly interferes with 
the exercise by the national bank of its powers,” and if 
(3) “the State consumer financial law is preempted by 
a provision of Federal law other than this title.”220 
However, regulation of federal student loan servicers could fall under 
one of these exceptions because it is possibly preempted by another 
provision of federal law.221 The courts are split on this issue: different 
courts have held that the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) both 
                                                            
216 Eggert, supra note 37, at 217-24 (discussing the effect of the Dodd–Frank 
Act on preemption of state consumer protection laws); Totten, supra note 28, at 128. 
Contra Raymond Natter & Katie Wechsler, Dodd–Frank Act and National Bank 
Preemption: Much Ado About Nothing, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 301, 304 (2012) 
(finding Dodd–Frank’s preemption language not to be a material change). 
217 12 U.S.C. § 5551(a). 
218 12 U.S.C. § 5587. 
219 Eggert, supra note 37, at 219-20 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 25b). 
220 Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 25b). 
221 12 U.S.C. § 25b. 
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preempts and does not preempt state law claims.222 Because the HEA 
is what may preempt state UDAP laws as applied to federal servicers, 
and not the Dodd–Frank Act, the Act’s presumption against 
preemption has not been of help in the field of federal student loan 
servicing.  
The cases so far make it clear that an explicit provision of the 
HEA, which does not require disclosure, preempts any state law that 
does contain a disclosure requirement.223 This provision states, 
“[l]oans made, insured, or guaranteed pursuant to a program 
authorized by Title IV of the Higher Education Act . . . shall not be 
subject to any disclosure requirements of any State law.”224 More 
drastically, the Ninth Circuit in Chae v. SLM Corp. held that this 
provision bars any “state-law prohibition on misrepresenting a 
business practice [because it] ‘is merely the converse’ of a state-law 
requirement that alternate disclosures be made.”225 As the court itself 
acknowledges, this means that consumers and SAGs will have 
problems alleging a deceptive misrepresentation under state UDAP 
laws.226  
However, there is no definitive answer on whether the HEA 
field preempts state UDAP prohibitions on deceptive practices. While 
the Ninth Circuit in Chae held that it did,227 several courts, including 
                                                            
222 Chae v. SLM Corp., 593 F.3d 936, 942-43, 950 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
the plaintiff’s claims against Sallie Mae were both either expressly preempted or 
field preempted). But see Coll. Loan Corp. v. SLM Corp., 396 F.3d 588, 599 (4th 
Cir. 2005) (“The HEA and its regulations do not preempt the state law claims which 
College Loan seeks to pursue in this proceeding.”); Brooks v. Salle Mae, Inc., No. 
FSTCV096002530S, 2011 WL 6989888, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2011) 
(distinguishing Chae and holding that the  HEA did not field preempt Connecticut’s 
consumer protection statute). However, the College Loan case did not implicate a 
state consumer protection law, only state tort law. 396 F.3d at 598. 
223 20 U.S.C. § 1098g. 
224 Id. 
225 Chae, 593 F.3d at 942-43 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 
504, 527 (1992)). 
226 Id. 
227 Id. at 947-50. (quoting Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 
141, 159, (1982)) (“Congress granted the DOE the power to prescribe regulations, 
access lender records, audit participants, impose civil penalties, suspend or 
terminate lenders from the program, and sue regulatory violators. A grant of ‘ample 
authority’ to regulate a detailed legislative scheme, such as the one administered by 
the DOE here, is evidence that Congress intended the agency to have the authority 
to preempt state law.”). 
Cox Article.docx (Do Not Delete)  3/9/15  5:45 PM 
2015 The Student Borrower 217 
the Fourth Circuit in College Loan Corp. v. SLM Corp., have not 
interpreted that provision of the HEA so broadly.228 But, if the Chae 
view ultimately prevails, all fifty states will be powerless to prevent 
abuses perpetrated by federal servicers (TIVASs), instead of only the 
nine discussed above.229 Therefore, this Article advocates for the 
CFPB to promulgate rules that will ultimately enable states act as a 
second line of defense behind the CFPB.230 
Other more substantive fixes to regulating mortgage servicers 
in the Dodd–Frank Act include mandating the use of escrow 
accounts,231 requiring responses to certain consumer inquiries,232 and 
ensuring prompt crediting of loan payments.233 Unfortunately, these 
fixes apply only to mortgage loans because of the inclusion of 
language that qualifies their applicability to only those loans “secured 
by a consumer’s principal dwelling.”234 Therefore, while the Dodd–
Frank Act has been, and should be, recognized for its positive effects 
on the mortgage market,235 the Act’s presumption against preemption 
                                                            
228 Coll. Loan Corp. v. SLM Corp., 396 F.3d 588, 598-99 (4th Cir. 2005) 
(holding the HEA does not preempt state tort law claims in a case between a lender 
and a servicer); Kentucky ex rel. Conway v. Daymar Learning, Inc., 4:11CV-00103-
JHM, 2012 WL 1014989 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 22, 2012) (citing Adkins v. Excel College 
of Corbin, Inc., Nos. 93-5138, 93-5139, 1994 WL 124268, *2 (6th Cir. April 11, 
1994)); Bland v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., No. ELH–11–02812, 2012 WL 603194, 
*4 (D. Md. Feb. 22, 2012) (citing College Loan Corp. v. SLM Corp., 396 F.3d 588 
(4th Cir.2005)) (“[C]ourts that have addressed this issue have consistently held that 
the HEA does not completely preempt state law claims.”); Brooks v. Salle Mae, 
Inc., No. FSTCV096002530S, 2011 WL 6989888 *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 
2011) The Brooks court hung its coat on two different lines of reasoning. First, “the 
fact that the HEA contains provisions that expressly preempt state law . . . precludes 
a finding that the HEA occupies the regulatory field and leaves no room for state 
law[,]” and second that “‘consumer protection is a field traditionally regulated by 
the states . . . and the Supreme Court has . . . reaffirmed that there is a presumption 
against finding implied preemption of state law in these fields.’” Id. (quoting Cliff v. 
Payco Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 363 F.3d 1113, 1126 (11th Cir. 2004)).  
229 See supra notes 181, 190-197 and accompanying text. 
230 See infra Section VI.C. 
231 15 U.S.C. § 1639d. 
232 12 U.S.C. § 2605. 
233 15 U.S.C. § 1639f. 
234 See, e.g., id. (“In connection with a consumer credit transaction secured by a 
consumer’s principal dwelling, no servicer shall fail to credit a payment to the 
consumer’s loan account as of the date of receipt.”) (emphasis added)). 
235 See generally Eggert, supra note 37 (discussing the effect of the Dodd–
Frank Act on mortgages and preemption of state consumer protection laws); Totten, 
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and more substantive statutory fixes will not be as useful for student 
loan borrowers. 
 
B. The Creation of a Federal Watchdog 
In addition to these statutory changes dealing with preemption 
and mortgage servicing, Congress, in the Dodd–Frank Act, created the 
CFPB.236 The CFPB was originally the brainchild of Senator 
Elizabeth Warren, who advocated for an agency with both the 
“authority and motivation” to provide consumers with effective 
protections.237 The CFPB has the power to “issu[e] rules, orders, and 
guidance implementing Federal consumer financial law.”238 The 
CFPB also has exclusive authority over federal depositories with over 
$10 billion in assets, while the OCC, NCUA, and FDIC retain their 
authority as to depositories with less than $10 billion in total assets.239  
Additionally, the Dodd–Frank Act gave the CFPB supervisory 
authority over certain non-bank persons.240 Unfortunately, the Dodd–
Frank Act again only recognizes the severity of servicing abuses in 
the mortgage servicing market, not the student loan servicing 
market.241 The Act grants the CFPB explicit authority over any person 
who “offers or provides origination, brokerage, or servicing of loans 
secured by real estate,” but only grants the CFPB supervisory 
authority over any person who “offers or provides to a consumer any 
private education loan.”242 The CFPB seems to confirm the absence of 
the “origination, brokerage, or servicing” language leaves them 
without the power to regulate private loan servicers unless that loan 
servicer is also a large depository institution, barring special 
circumstances.243 Although some commentators have read this section 
                                                            
supra note 28 (discussing how the Dodd–Frank Act affected the state consumer 
protection regulation landscape). 
236 12 U.S.C. § 5491. 
237 See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 19, at 85. 
238 12 U.S.C. § 5511. 
239 12 U.S.C. §§ 5515-16. 
240 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1). 
241 Id. 
242 Id. (emphasis added). 
243 CFPB to Oversee Nonbank Student Loan Servicers, CONSUMER FIN. 
PROTECTION BUREAU (Dec. 3, 2013), 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-to-oversee-nonbank-student-loan-
servicers/.  
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differently,244 this Article will continue under the CFPB’s 
interpretation that it does not have explicit statutory authority over 
private loan servicers, which comports better with the plain language 
of the statute.245 
While the grant of authority over those institutions that offer 
or provide student loans does not cover servicers, it has given the 
CFPB a special interest in the student loan arena.246 Notably, the 
CFPB passed a larger-participant rule, which took effect in March 
2014.247 Larger-participant rules allow the CFPB to define certain 
“larger participant[s] of a market for other consumer financial 
products or services.”248 Once these participants of the market are 
defined, the CFPB can then exercise supervisory authority over them 
as if they were one of the non-bank persons over which the CFPB has 
explicit authority.249 The CFPB has interpreted this power as 
permitting the agency to select different criteria best suited to each 
market to define what exactly would make a participant “larger.”250 
Given the lack of explicit authority over student loan servicers, this 
wide grant of authority is particularly important.251  
 The designation as a larger participant is critical because it 
allows the CFPB to regulate the market through enforcement actions 
under its UDAAP authority and helps the CFPB consider potential 
                                                            
244 Michael A. Benoit & Jeffrey P. Taft, CFPB Developments: Coordinating the 
Supervision of Depository and Non-Depository Institutions, 68 BUS. L. 619, 621 
(2013). 
245 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1). 
246 For instance, the CFPB has a very helpful website on paying for college. 
Paying for College, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/paying-for-college/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2014); see 
also supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (discussing the CFPB’s student loan 
consumer-complaint database); see infra notes 258-263 (explaining the CFPB’s new 
student loan servicer larger participant rule). 
247 Defining Larger Participants of the Student Loan Servicing Market, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 73,383 (Dec. 6, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. Part 1090). 
248 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1)(D). 
249 12 U.S.C. Id. § 5514(b)(1). 
250 CFPB Proposes Rule to Supervise Larger Participants in Consumer Debt 
Collection and Consumer Reporting Markets, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION 
BUREAU (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/consumer-
financial-protection-bureau-proposes-rule-to-supervise-larger-participants-in-
consumer-debt-collection-and-consumer-reporting-markets/. 
251 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1).  
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UDAPP-defining rules.252 In the new student loan servicing rule, the 
Bureau stated that it “will be examining whether larger participants of 
the student loan-servicing market engage in unfair, deceptive, or 
abusive acts or practices (UDAAPs). Conduct that does not violate an 
express prohibition of another Federal consumer financial law may 
nonetheless constitute a UDAAP.”253  
 The extra “A” in this UDAAP is attributable to Congress’ 
extension of the old federal UDAP authority to also cover abusive 
acts.254 Therefore, the CFPB now has authority over any “unfair, 
deceptive, or abusive act or practice.”255 However, there is a critical 
wrinkle in the power granted under this blanket UDAAP regulation. 
While the CFPB will have the authority to enforce any UDAAP 
violation, whether a specific rule defines the conduct as a UDAAP or 
not, SAGs will not have the ability to enforce any potential UDAAP 
violations until the CFPB has first issued a rule declaring that a 
particular act or practice constitutes a UDAAP.256 The CFPB can pass 
these UDAAP-defining rules, which “may include requirements for 
the purpose of preventing such acts or practices.”257 
As for the newly passed student loan servicer larger-
participant rule, the CFPB has determined that one is a larger 
participant in the market if the entity and its affiliated companies 
perform student loan servicing duties on over one million accounts.258 
                                                            
252 Defining Larger Participants of the Student Loan Servicing Market, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 73,387. 
253 Id. 
254 12 U.S.C. § 5531. There is quite a litany of fascinating scholarship on 
exactly what the new abusive standard means. See Carey Alexander, Abusive: 
Dodd–Frank Section 1031 and the Continuing Struggle to Protect Consumers, 85 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1105, 1127 (2011) (urging the CFPB to adopt an expansive 
interpretation of what abusive means); Rebecca Schonberg, Introducing 
“Abusive:”: A New and Improved Standard for Consumer Protection, 100 CAL. L. 
REV. 1401, 1432-42 (2012) (discussing how abusive might cover some territory 
beyond the prohibitions against unfair or deceptive acts or practices). 
25512 U.S.C. § 5531 (emphasis added).  
256 12 U.S.C. § 5552(a)(2)(B); Hillebrand, supra note 27, at 223 (“In the area of 
enforcement, there should be many enforcers. State Attorneys General will be able 
to enforce both state and federal law with respect to national banks. There’s an odd 
wrinkle here: state Attorneys General cannot enforce those statutory provisions on 
unfair, deceptive and abusive practices but they will be able to enforce the rules 
under those provisions.”). 
257 12 U.S.C. § 5531(b). 
258 12 C.F.R. § 1090.106(b) (2014). 
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This covers all the government’s servicers (TIVASs) and two other 
private loan servicers259 but may leave as much as 29% of the non-
bank market unregulated.260 Like all other larger-participant rules, the 
rule “does not impose new substantive consumer protection 
requirements.”261 However, it is important to note that the oversight 
allows the CFPB to gather better information on exactly what 
practices servicers are engaging in that might constitute a violation of 
the CFPB’s UDAAP power.262 Therefore, while this new rule is 
hugely important for federal oversight of the market, it does nothing 
to create greater state oversight as a second line of defense for 
students or to protect students with private loans serviced by smaller 
servicers.263 Instead, students serviced by the “smaller participants” of 
the market must wait for the CFPB to pass substantive regulations on 
what student loan servicers can and cannot do before SAGs will be 
able to act as a second line of defense.264  
 
C. An Executive Gesture 
On June 9, 2014, President Obama announced in a presidential 
memorandum executive-branch changes to the current system of 
federal education lending.265 A presidential memorandum is widely 
considered to be simply one form of an executive order in a legal 
sense,266 although in the technical sense, it is not an executive order, 
but an executive action.267 The only major announcement dealing with 
                                                            
259 Defining Larger Participants of the Student Loan Servicing Market, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 73,383, 73,386-87 (Dec. 6, 2013). 
260 Id. 
261 Id. at 73,384. 
262 Id. at 73,400. 
263 12 U.S.C. § 5514(c)(1) (“[W]ith respect to any person described in 
subsection (a)(1) [which includes larger participants] the Bureau shall have 
exclusive authority to enforce that Federal consumer financial law.”). 
264 Hillebrand, supra note 27, at 223.  
265 Helping Struggling Federal Student Loan Borrowers Manage Their Debt, 79 
Fed. Reg. 33,843 (June 9, 2014). 
266 John C. Duncan, Jr., A Critical Consideration of Executive Orders: 
Glimmerings of Autopoiesis in the Executive Role, 35 VT. L. REV. 333, 352, 352 
n.152 (2010).  
267 Id.; Dan Amira, President Obama Didn’t Sign Any Executive Orders Today, 
DAILY INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 16, 2013), 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/01/obama-23-executive-orders-actions-
gun-control.html.  
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federal student loan servicing in this memorandum was that “[b]y 
December 31, 2014, the Secretary of Education shall develop, 
evaluate, and implement new targeted strategies to reach borrowers 
who may be struggling to repay their Federal student loans to ensure 
that they have the information they need to select the best repayment 
option and avoid future default.”268 The memorandum also announced 
several other potential improvements to help students with their 
loans.269 The biggest potential improvement deals with the wider 
availability of alternative repayment plans for loans, and not with loan 
servicing.270  
On that same day the Department of Education also announced 
that it would be “strengthen[ing] the incentives for loan contractors to 
serve students well.”271 To do so, the Department announced it would 
renegotiate its contracts with federal student loan servicers. However, 
certain abuses such as extending student loan repayment and adding 
excessive ancillary fees are not addressed in this action.272 The 
incentives addressed will focus solely on helping students avoid 
delinquency and default by granting bonuses to servicers for reducing 
the default rates of their borrowers.273 While these two executive 
actions will bring greater attention to the issue of student lending, 
these actions may be nothing more than a gesture when it comes to the 
issues of excessive ancillary fees and extending the length of time that 
students remain in repayment.274 
                                                            
268 Helping Struggling Federal Student Loan Borrowers Manage Their Debt, 79 
Fed. Reg. 33,843. 
269 Id. 
270 Id. But see Anna Bahr, Obama’s Move to Help Students Is Not as Forgiving 
as It Seems, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/24/upshot/obamas-move-to-help-students-is-not-
as-forgiving-as-it-seems.html?_r=0 (discussing why this change might not be 
enough.). 
271 The White House, Office of the President, FACTSHEET: Making Student 
Loans More Affordable, THE WHITE HOUSE (June 9, 2014), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/09/factsheet-making-student-
loans-more-affordable.  
272 Helping Struggling Federal Student Loan Borrowers Manage Their Debt, 79 
Fed. Reg. 33,843. 
273 Stratford supra note 29 (“Officials have renegotiated the government’s contracts 
with the four main loan servicers, which together collect payments for tens of 
millions of federal student loan borrowers. The servicers will now also receive 
bonuses for reducing the delinquency rates of their borrowers.”), 
274 See infra text accompanying notes 313-319. 
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VI. SERVICING SOLUTIONS TO UNSHACKLE STUDENTS 
At this point, one question remains: did the federal consumer 
financial regulatory overhaul led by the Dodd–Frank Act do enough 
to free students from servicer abuses, or are student borrowers still 
slave to the servicer? The new scheme undoubtedly provides greater 
accountability in the mortgage servicing market275 and, in general, 
provides SAGs with greater authority in the field of financial 
consumer protection than they had in the years prior to the passage of 
the Dodd–Frank Act.276 However, with the growing abuses reported in 
the field of student loan servicing,277 the inherent vulnerabilities of the 
average student borrower,278 and the effect that high student loan debt 
has on other financial markets,279 it is absolutely critical that student 
loan servicers are held accountable. 
While the executive branch as a whole and the CFPB 
particularly seem headed towards greater market oversight,280 states 
should be proactive in creating a strong dual-enforcement regime to 
protect students from unscrupulous student loan servicing practices. 
After all, preemption and federal inaction played a large role in 
precipitating the subprime mortgage crisis.281 To allow states to act as 
a second line of defense, the CFPB should take action by adopting 
UDAAP-defining rules.282 If they do not, greater accountability could 
                                                            
275 Eggert, supra note 37, at 217-24. 
276 Totten, supra note 28, at 174 (“Empowering states to enforce federal law 
was only one of multiple strategies Congress employed in the wake of the Great 
Recession to protect consumers in the financial marketplace. Nonetheless, this 
strategy is critical.”). 
277 See supra Section II.B. 
278 See supra Section II.A. 
279 See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text (discussing the “domino effect” 
that high student loan debt is having on other markets such as housing and small-
business start-ups). 
280 Rohit Chopra, We Asked About Your Student Loans and You Answered, 
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Feb. 3, 2014), 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/we-asked-about-your-student-loans-and-you-
answered/ (discussing CFPB action on the issue of student loans, including the 
larger participant rule and providing a form letter for students to use in their 
communications with servicers). 
281 Eggert, supra note 37, at 207-13. 
282 This Article argues that it should and that doing so is the best of the possible 
options for student borrowers. See infra Section VI.C. 
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be accomplished in two other ways: (1) through greater consumer 
choice in federal loan programs;283 and (2) through a multi-state SAG 
enforcement action led by SAG in states with the strongest consumer 
protection statutes.284  
 
A. Why the Current Regulatory Scheme Is Insufficient 
The most glaring issue with the new federal scheme is that the 
2010 consumer financial protection reforms are too finely tuned to the 
causes of the 2008 mortgage crisis and apply exclusively to mortgage 
servicing and Dodd–Frank Act preemption.285 This leaves regulation 
of student loan servicers to other means, namely rules developed by 
the CFPB pursuant to its Dodd–Frank Act authority.286 Unfortunately, 
the only current CFPB rule on the issue is the larger-participant rule, 
which provides only for CFPB oversight—not any substantive 
protections.287 The lack of any other significant regulation presents 
two issues. 
First, the lack of substantive, UDAAP-defining rules leaves 
the states with only their own UDAP bans as the basis for any 
authority over student loan servicers until the CFPB passes a rule 
determining what specific acts or practices constitute a UDAAP 
violation under its rulemaking authority.288 With the Dodd–Frank 
Act’s focus on dual-enforcement authority for federal and state 
regulators as well as SAGs traditionally important role as consumer 
advocates, such a result is puzzling.289 Further, any SAG claiming to 
bring an action within the scope of their UDAP powers must actually 
plan on bringing an action, instead of merely using any investigative 
authority they may have under their state’s UDAP statute as a way to 
oversee the servicer in question.290 The Supreme Court deemed such a 
                                                            
283 See infra Section VI.B. 
284 See infra Section VI.D. 
285 See supra Section V.A. 
286 12 U.S.C. §§ 5511-14 (2012). 
287 See supra notes 258-261 and accompanying text. 
288 12 U.S.C. § 5514(c)(1) (“[W]ith respect to any person described in 
subsection (a)(1) . . . the Bureau shall have exclusive authority to enforce that 
Federal consumer financial law.”). 
289 See Totten, supra note 28, at 123-25; Hillebrand, supra note 27, at 223. 
290 See Totten, supra note 29, at 145 (citing Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 
L.L.C., 557 U.S. 519, 536 (2009)). 
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use of investigatory powers an illegal exercise of “visitorial 
powers.”291 Therefore, states cannot regulate without the intent to 
actually litigate. An even bigger problem remains, however, because 
states that actually attempt to litigate might be preempted by the 
HEA.292 
Second, by definition, the CFPB can only regulate larger 
participants of the student loan servicing market under larger-
participant rules, leaving smaller participants unregulated by the 
CFPB.293 These smaller servicers would then be free from federal 
oversight, unlike their larger brothers and sisters.294 This could leave 
as much as 29% of the non-bank market unregulated at the federal 
level.295 It would then be solely up to state UDAP prohibitions—
which vary greatly in their applicability296—to protect student 
borrowers from smaller servicers. 
Therefore, depending upon the scope of each state’s consumer 
protection provisions297 and how courts interpret the HEA,298 there are 
likely large holes in the new regulatory scheme. Regardless, nine 
states and the District of Columbia are unambiguously unable to use 
their UDAP power to protect students from servicer abuses.299 If the 
view of the Ninth Circuit prevails over the Fourth Circuit and other 
courts on HEA preemption,300 then the lack of UDAAP-defining rules 
and the inability of the CFPB to regulate smaller participants creates 
two even larger problems: (1) TIVASs would be subject solely to 
CFPB oversight; and (2) most non-TIVASs would not be subject to 
any oversight.  
                                                            
291 Cuomo, 557 U.S. at 536. This decision was later adopted in Dodd–Frank and 
is now codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25(b). 
292 See supra notes 227-228 and accompanying text (discussing the uncertain 
status of HEA preemption of state consumer protection laws). 
293 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1)(b), (a)(2). 
294 While it is not entirely clear how many servicers will end up being covered 
by the larger participant rule, the final rule states that it is likely that seven entities 
would be covered by this rule. Defining Larger Participants of the Student Loan 
Servicing Market, 78 Fed. Reg. 73,383, 73,395-96 (Dec. 6, 2013).  
295 See supra note 259-260 and accompanying text.  
296 See supra notes 178-193 and accompanying text. 
297 See supra notes 178-193 and accompanying text. 
298 See supra notes 222-228 and accompanying text. 
299 See supra notes 181, 190-197 and accompanying text. 
300 See supra notes 227-228 and accompanying text. 
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 Because the HEA would preempt the forty-one state 
UDAPs,301 which may apply to student loan servicers,302 TIVASs and 
the one or two other larger participants would be regulated solely by 
the CFPB under the larger-participant rule. This CFPB regulation 
would consist of oversight only for blanket, undefined UDAAP 
violations.303 Therefore, if the CFPB was ever subject to “agency 
capture”304 by the servicing market, there would be no oversight of 
the nation’s largest student loan servicers.305 
Even more problematic, most non-TIVASs would not be 
subject to any federal regulation,306 unless the non-TIVAS was also a 
large depository institution307 or one of the few additional servicers 
covered by the larger-participant rule.308 Given the fact that these 
servicers are by definition smaller, it is unlikely that many fit these 
exceptions. However, SAGs would have the power to regulate these 
non-TIVAS smaller-participant servicers because SAGs would not be 
preempted by the HEA, which regulates only TIVASs,309 and the 
Dodd–Frank Act’s presumption against preemption would ensure that 
the CFPB’s authority over the few non-TIVAS larger participants did 
not preempt state UDAP bans.310  But, in the nine states whose UDAP 
statutes would be unambiguously inapplicable to any lender–servicer–
                                                            
301 See supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
302 See supra notes 182-189, 199 and accompanying text. 
303 See supra notes 258-264 and accompanying text. 
304 Dennis D. Hirsch, Going Dutch? Collaborative Dutch Privacy Regulation and 
the Lessons It Holds for U.S. Privacy Law, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 83, 106 n.142 
(“Agency capture is the control or domination of administrative agencies by private 
parties who are subject to the regulatory authority of the agency. It occurs when a 
regulated entity, for example a group of corporations, replaces the public-policy 
agenda of the agency with its own private and self-serving agenda through lobbying 
or other influential methods.”). 
305 See Jared Elosta, Dynamic Federalism and Consumer Financial Protection: 
How the Dodd–Frank Act Changes the Preemption Debate, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1273, 
1296 (2011) (“In spite of these reasons for optimism that the CFPB will be able to 
fulfill its mission, capture remains a serious threat: considering the lobbying power 
of the financial industry, it will likely be aggressive in its attempt to capture the 
CFPB.”). 
306 See supra note 293 and accompanying text. 
307 See supra note 243 and accompanying text. 
308 See supra note 259 and accompanying test. 
309 See supra note 117.  
310 See supra notes 219-220 and accompanying text. 
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borrower relationship,311 these smaller participants would be left 
completely unregulated. Even if these servicers constitute only a small 
fragment of the student loan servicing industry—the CFPB estimates 
this could leave as much as 29% of the nonbank market 
uncovered312—a complete lack of regulation of even a small number 
of servicers is disconcerting.  
Further, President Obama’s new presidential memorandum on 
select issues confronting students with education loans amounted to 
no more than a gesture with no effect on the issues addressed in this 
Article. In terms of servicing, the memorandum only directed the 
Secretary of the Department of Education to develop “targeted 
strategies” to help students pick the right repayment plan.313 
Moreover, the Department of Education’s renegotiation of contracts 
with servicers to provide servicers incentives to help students avoid 
delinquency and default addressed neither the issue of excessive and 
abusive ancillary fees, nor servicers improperly keeping student loans 
in repayment.314 Additionally, these incentives largely consist of 
paying servicers bonuses for reducing the rate of delinquency or 
default of the borrowers they service.315 However, federal loans are 
already structured to compensate servicers better when loans are kept 
out of delinquency or default.316 Therefore, it is unclear how an 
additional bonus would make a difference in this area, especially 
when servicers could simply make up any difference in payment by 
charging a greater number of ancillary fees or larger amounts in 
ancillary fees to those students’ loans.317 Moreover, this executive 
action will do nothing for the students who do not borrow from the 
federal government, namely the students who borrow from the 
potentially completely unregulated smaller participants.318 Therefore, 
                                                            
311 See supra notes 181, 190-197 and accompanying text. 
312 See supra note 259-260 and accompanying text. 
313 Helping Struggling Federal Student Loan Borrowers Manage Their Debt, 79 
Fed. Reg. 33,843 (June 9, 2014). 
314 The White House, Office of the President, supra note 271; Stratford supra 
note 29. 
315 Stratford supra note 29 (“The servicers will now also receive bonuses for 
reducing the delinquency rates of their borrowers”).  
316 See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. 
317 Remember, the federal government as well as private lenders generally 
allow servicers to keep any ancillary fees assessed. Levitin & Twomey, supra note 
13, at 41. 
318 See supra notes 258-263 and accompanying text.  
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these well-intentioned federal actions on the problems in the student 
loan servicing market are too narrowly tailored to delinquency and 
default, and they fail to fix the problems that many students continue 
to report to the CFPB.319 Further action must be taken. 
 
B. Consumer Choice 
A more free-market approach to fixing the reported student 
loan servicing abuses would be to allow student loan borrowers 
greater freedom in choosing their servicer.320 Currently, students are 
not given a choice over who services their federal loans.321 The 
federal government, while still retaining control over which entities 
qualify for student loan servicing, could allow students to pick which 
of these servicers they wanted. But, even in the field of private student 
loans, where students could technically bargain over which entity 
services their loan,322 the relative differences in bargaining experience 
and power between the two parties makes such an exercise beneficial 
for only a limited number of the most sophisticated student 
borrowers.323 Remember, most students taking out student loans have 
little to no experience in taking out a loan of that size.324  
The government could help make a student’s decision an 
informed one by giving the information the government uses to 
measure servicer performance directly to the student when it comes 
time for him or her to choose a servicer.325 This information could be 
made available to all student borrowers through the Department of 
Education and CFPB websites, so as to enable easy access to servicer-
performance information, leveling the bargaining field between 
                                                            
319 See generally Annual Report of the CFPB Student Loan Ombudsman, supra 
note 56. 
320 See Levitin & Twomey, supra note 13, at 83 (discussing the possibility of 
consumers bargaining over assignability of mortgage servicing). 
321 See supra notes 116-118 and accompanying text. 
322 See Levitin & Twomey, supra note 13, at 83. 
323 See Lary Lawrence, Toward a More Efficient and Just Economy: An 
Argument for Limited Enforcement of Consumer Promises, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 815, 
825-26 (1987) (discussing inherent weaknesses in consumers that more 
sophisticated sellers frequently exploit). 
324 See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text. 
325 See DiGangi, supra note 15 (discussing the current federal report card used 
to evaluate student loan servicers). 
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student and servicer.326 However, more than just information is 
necessary to make the correct decision. Students must also possess the 
ability to decipher such information.327 The government could 
ameliorate this concern by presenting the information in the form of 
an easy-to-use, easy-to-comprehend website that employs comparison 
tools.328  
This solution would vary in three significant ways from past 
attempts at consumer self-protection, which have been notoriously 
unsuccessful.329 First, it would give students the ability to avoid any 
potentially unscrupulous practices in the first place, instead of having 
to first suffer the consequences of such practices to bring a lawsuit. 
Second, it would likely be more effective than lawsuits, which are 
largely not worth a student’s time and money due to the nature of the 
seemingly insignificant fees these servicers charge.330 However, these 
fees do add up when assessed to a multitude of borrowers.331 Third, 
students would no longer be at the mercy of the court system in 
determining whether they have contractual privity to bring a common 
law claim332 or whether their state UDAP provision covered loan 
servicers.333  
However, even if the government gave students the 
information necessary for them to make an informed decision, 
significant obstacles to a consumer-choice solution remain. First, for 
the proposed information-sharing website this solution is based on to 
help all students, the government would have to start collecting 
information for private servicers as well, instead of just TIVASs.334 
                                                            
326 This is an important concept in consumer law. See Lawrence, supra note 
323, at 818-19 (discussing the importance of making information available to 
consumers and the lack of an incentive for sellers to do so). 
327 Id. at 825 (discussing the need for consumers to possess the ability to select 
which information is most relevant for them).  
328 The CFPB, in the context of choosing how to pay for college, has a great 
website for the template of such a site. See generally Paying for College, supra note 
246. 
329 See supra Part III. 
330 Levitin & Twomey, supra note 13, at 43. 
331 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
332 See supra pp. 201-02 (detailing the availability of common-law claims 
against servicers). 
333 See supra pp. 209-12 (discussing the applicability of state-specific UDAP 
statutes to claims against servicers). 
334 See DiGangi, supra note 15. 
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Such an undertaking would likely require a prohibitive influx of 
staffing and money. Second, because students often overestimate their 
ability to pay back loans, they will likely not worry over who is 
servicing their loans.335 Third, it is extremely doubtful that young 
consumers would research a product even if the information is freely 
available. Therefore, while front-end consumer choice is potentially a 
more appealing option than back-end enforcement, this solution still 
faces a significant obstacle in the form of the overly optimistic and 
hard-to-inform student.336 Due to these concerns, and potentially 
others,337 this Article advocates consumer choice only as an 
alternative to a stronger dual-enforcement regime. This alternative is 
posed largely due to the recognition that not all policymakers will be 
receptive to the idea of greater government oversight and that some 
change in this market is preferable to no change whatsoever. 
However, a stronger dual-enforcement regime, whether accomplished 
by CFPB rulemaking or a SAG settlement, would best solve the 
problems that plague the market.338 
 
C. Defining UDAAPs in the Student Loan Servicing Market 
 The best possible fix to the current regulatory regime would be 
further CFPB involvement. While the student loan servicer larger-
participant rule was an important step on the road to greater 
oversight,339 it did not provide for any substantive protections.340 The 
CFPB should pass rules defining exactly what constitutes a UDAAP. 
This would implicitly give SAGs the authority to prevent and punish 
these specific UDAPs, thereby creating a state–federal dual-
enforcement regime.341 
                                                            
335 See Simpson, supra note 50. 
336 See supra Section II.A. 
337 Additional concerns would be the cost of this solution and whether such a 
solution would be feasible. 
338 See supra Sections VI.C-D. 
339 See supra notes 252-255 and accompanying text. 
340 See supra note 261 and accompanying text. 
341 See supra note 256 and accompanying text (discussing how once the CFPB 
has defined what specifically constitutes a UDAAP, pursuant to their rule-making 
authority, SAGs can enforce that prohibition, but until then, only the CFPB can 
enforce the blanket UDAAP prohibition). 
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These rules should focus specifically on the abuses that 
consumers reported to the CFPB.342 These rules should include 
requirements that forbid servicers from giving inaccurate pay-off 
information343 and from placing students in the wrong repayment 
plan.344 Further, these rules should require that servicers apply both 
over- and underpayments in the way specified by the student,345 apply 
payments in a timely manner,346 and give students adequate notice if 
their loan servicer changes.347 Finally, if the borrower did not specify 
a way to apply the payments, the rules should require that the 
payments will be applied in a way that avoids as many late fees as 
possible and pays off the loans with the highest interest rates and 
principal amounts first.348 These changes would eliminate the abuses 
reported to the CFPB and would prevent servicers from abusing 
students by charging excessive ancillary fees and extending students’ 
time in debt repayment.349 
A major drawback to the CFPB passing UDAAP-defining 
regulations would be the added costs to both businesses and 
government. The costs would likely be similar to the costs the CFPB 
noted when they adopted the larger-participant rule.350 The CFPB 
noted that, while the rule might result in increased operating costs, the 
costs of compliance would largely be borne by the larger participants, 
not students.351 “While the price of servicing Federal student loans 
might change, depending on market conditions, the pricing for and 
access to Federal student loans would likely not change substantially 
as a consequence of increases in servicers’ compliance with Federal 
consumer financial law.”352 The Bureau, using prior mortgage-
servicer investigations as a guide, estimated that a servicer would 
spend roughly $24,000 in assuring compliance during a normal larger-
                                                            
342 See supra Section II.B. 
343 See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text. 
344 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
345 See supra notes 68, 77-79 and accompanying text.  
346 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
347 See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. 
348 See supra notes 68, 77-79 and accompanying text. 
349 See supra Section II.B. 
350 See Defining Larger Participants of the Student Loan Servicing Market, 78 
Fed. Reg. 73,383, 73,400-03 (Dec. 6, 2013).  
351 Id. This would be especially true for federal student loans with interest rates 
and loan limits that are determined statutorily. Id. at 73,400. 
352Id. 
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participant examination.353 However, one could assume that an 
examination into a more specific UDAAP violation would not be as 
expensive as this overall UDAAP-compliance figure. While costs 
could rise if SAGs and the CFPB do not coordinate and each bring 
separate examinations over similar violations, each SAG is required to 
provide the CFPB with a copy of the complaint so as to encourage 
consultation.354 Therefore, the costs of any added regulations would 
not be felt by students and, at a cost of likely less than $24,000, 
should be negligible for these financial services companies. 
Defined-UDAAP regulations provide three benefits: (1) easier 
adjudication of UDAAP violations; (2) upfront notice to servicers as 
to what constitutes a UDAAP; and (3) a second line of defense for 
students in the form of SAG enforcement of these rules. First, instead 
of the CFPB having to prove that a certain set of acts or practices by a 
servicer was unfair, deceptive, or abusive, a definition of acts and 
practices that constitute UDAAPs will allow the CFPB to simply 
prove that the act occurred, and at that point, the action will be 
deemed either unfair, deceptive, or abusive as a matter of law.355 
Second, clear regulations will give servicers upfront notice as to what 
constitutes a UDAAP and will help prevent students from being 
subjected to that act or practice in the first place.356 Third, the 
importance of a dual-enforcement financial consumer protection 
regime is monumental.357 If the CFPB does not define what 
constitutes a UDAAP, at least nine states and the District of Columbia 
will be unable to protect students from servicer abuses.358 
Additionally, depending upon how the HEA preemption battle plays 
out, state UDAP claims against federal student loan servicers could be 
preempted.359 Further, SAGs would be empowered to monitor smaller 
participants, who, without UDAAP-defining rules, are left 
                                                            
353 Id. at 73,402. 
354 12 U.S.C. § 5552(b)(1)(A) (2012) (“[T]o enforce any provision of this title, 
including any regulation prescribed by the Bureau under this title, a State attorney 
general or State regulator shall timely provide a copy of the complete complaint to 
be filed and written notice describing such action or proceeding to the Bureau and 
the prudential regulator.”). 
355 12 U.S.C. § 5531(b). 
356 See id. 
357 See, e.g., supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text. 
358 See supra notes 181, 190-197 and accompanying text. 
359 See supra notes 227-228 and accompanying text. 
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unregulated at the federal level and completely unregulated in the nine 
states without UDAPs that apply in the lender–servicer–borrower 
context.360 Without states to act as this second line of defense, the 
specter of agency capture looms large, as it does with any agency that 
has exclusive authority over a field of law.361 While the CFPB is 
designed to be insulated from agency capture,362 it would be more 
difficult—if not impossible—for the student loan servicing market to 
“capture” both the CFPB and all fifty SAGs.  
 
D. SAG Teamwork: Regulation Through Litigation 
Alternatively, SAGs should band together in a fifty-state 
enforcement action against student loan servicers.363 SAGs have often 
aided each other in situations where one has a stronger enforcement 
regime than another.364 One major drawback to this approach is that it 
is reactionary and not preventative. Instead of monitoring student loan 
servicers to prevent unsavory practices the CFPB has defined as 
UDAAPs on the front end, SAGs would be litigating against these 
practices on the back end—after they have already occurred. 
However, through such a suit, SAGs may be able to obtain a 
settlement that provides for substantive protections. 
                                                            
360 See supra notes 293-294 and accompanying text. See supra notes 377-381 
and accompanying text, for a complete discussion on why SAGs are important in 
the dual-enforcement regime advocated here. 
361 See supra notes 304-305 and accompanying text. 
362 See generally Michael C. Nissim-Sabat, Capturing This Watchdog? The 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Keeping the Special Interests Out of Its 
House, 40 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2012) (describing how the CFPB can avoid 
regulatory capture). 
363 See supra notes 181-197 and accompanying text. One other potential 
solution, which is outside the scope of this Article, would be a movement in the 
states whose statutes do not apply to loan servicers to adopt a more inclusive UDAP 
statute. One example of a helpful formulation is that of the State of Washington, 
which focuses on the effect of the violation and not necessarily the identity of the 
violator. See supra note 189. This solution is not seriously considered in this Article 
because of the difficulty in getting at least ten sovereigns to pass such statutes.  
364 This Article has already discussed one such example. See supra note 203 
and accompanying text. However, some commentators disapprove of this practice. 
See, e.g., Jerry W. Markham, Merging the SEC and CFTC—A Clash of Cultures, 78 
U. CIN. L. REV. 537, 542 (2009) (calling SAGs “wolf packs” who attack financial 
institutions). 
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This is exactly what SAGs did when they settled with 
mortgage servicers in 2012.365 In addition to the $25 billion payout to 
SAGs, some of the substantive protections included “requiring a 
single point of contact for borrowers, establishing case review and 
paperwork processing requirements and deadlines, and restricting 
practices such as ‘dual tracking’ (when banks pursue a loan 
modification while simultaneously pursuing a foreclosure).”366 This 
settlement not only provided for these substantive requirements, but 
also provided for a monitor to ensure compliance with these agreed-to 
protections.367 The monitor, while lacking enforcement power in 
itself, serves as an alert system for the D.C. court to enforce the 
requirements.368 
From a practical standpoint, the suit must be led by a SAG 
with ample statutory authority under that state’s s UDAP. The 
Connecticut Attorney General would be an ideal candidate because 
Connecticut has strong consumer protection laws for student loan 
servicers369 that are not HEA field preempted under Connecticut state 
court precedent.370 The suit would ideally result in a settlement that 
incorporated the substantive protections discussed above in the 
context of CFPB rulemaking.371 Additionally, this settlement should 
provide for a monitor to alert the court if servicers are not adhering to 
these provisions.372 
This strategy is not without its risks. First, there is the cost of 
litigation. In the mortgage settlement, the executive committee that 
negotiated the final agreement required $10 million in attorneys’ 
                                                            
365 State Attorneys General, Feds Reach $25 Billion Settlement with Five 
Largest Mortgage Servicers on Foreclosure Wrongs, supra note 203.  
366 Id. 
367 Id. 
368 Frequently Asked Questions, OFF. MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT OVERSIGHT, 
https://www.jasmithmonitoring.com/omso/faqs/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2014). 
369 Brooks v. Salle Mae, Inc., No. FSTCV096002530S, 2011 WL 6989888, at 
*7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2011) (construing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42–110(a), et 
seq. (2010)). 
370 Id. However, this will ultimately be an issue for the federal courts to decide, 
which are currently split on this issue. See supra notes 227-228 and accompanying 
text.  
371 See supra notes 342-347 and accompanying text. 
372 See supra note 368 and accompanying text. 
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fees,373 and this amount did not cover what each state individually 
spent.374 A repeat performance of such a well-orchestrated settlement 
might be hard to come by, and if SAGs lose, they will have to foot the 
bill on their own. However, SAGs have successfully banded together 
in other lawsuits, including the national tobacco settlement.375 This 
uncertainty should not deter SAGs—the abuses documented in the 
student loan servicing market should give them ample incentive and 
bargaining power in any potential suit.376 
Much like CFPB UDAAP-defining rules, the positives of a 
settlement with substantive protections would be a dual-enforcement 
regime and upfront notice to servicers as to what constitutes a 
UDAAP.377 Using SAGs as a second line of defense presents at least 
three major benefits. First, with their local consumer complaint 
systems, SAGs are truly in the best position to hear the issues 
prevalent in their local market.378 Second, SAGs are also more nimble 
than a large regulatory agency like the CFPB.379 And third, almost all 
SAGs are elected,380 whereas the Director of the CFPB is 
                                                            
373 National Mortgage Settlement Summary, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/national-mortgage-
settlement-summary.aspx (last updated Sept. 4, 2013). 
374 See id. (discussing how each SAG who signed the final judgment allocated 
its split of the settlement funds for attorneys’ fees).  
375 The ABCs of the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, NAT’L ASS’N 
ATTORNEYS GEN., 
http://www.naag.org/publications/naagazette/volume_1_number_2/the_abcs_of_the
_tobacco_master_settlement_agreement.php (last visited Jan. 28, 2015) (discussing 
the 46-state tobacco settlement).  
376 See supra Section II.B. However, SAGs will lose all bargaining power if the 
court hearing the case finds that the state consumer protection statute is preempted 
by the HEA. See supra notes 227-228 and accompanying text (discussing the 
current stance of courts on the issue of HEA preemption of state consumer 
protection statutes). 
377 See supra notes 357-362 and accompanying text.  
378 See supra notes 139-140 and accompanying text. 
379 Chatman, supra note 33, at 606 (commenting that Washington has been too 
slow to react to changes in the mortgage servicing industry); Sarah W. Rubenstein, 
Comment, CERCLA’s Contribution to the Federal Brownfields Problem: A 
Proposal for Federal Reform, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 149, 163 (1997) 
(commenting that because states are smaller and “more centralized,” they are more 
nimble than the federal government). 
380 Attorney General Election Updates, NAT’L ASS’N ATTORNEYS GEN., 
http://www.naag.org/publications/naagazette/volume-4-number-9/attorney-general-
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appointed.381 This direct link to the voters makes SAGs more 
accountable to students than the bureaucrats at the CFPB.382 
Therefore, if the CFPB does not act, SAGs must take matters into 
their own hands and become the emancipators that students so 
desperately need. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
 While many problems exist within the field of student lending, 
one area that has yet to receive enough attention is student loan 
servicing. Student loan servicers have engaged in a pattern of 
unsavory, and frankly illegal, practices aimed at increasing their profit 
margins, including charging students excessive ancillary fees and 
engaging in conduct that causes students to spend more time in 
repayment, accruing interest on the underlying debt.383 While students 
are unlikely to be able to defend themselves in court,384 a consumer-
choice solution coupled with better access to servicer information 
might result in students stemming the abuse themselves.385 However, 
this is unlikely.386  
Students deserve a stronger regulatory regime to free them 
from the servicing abuses that are preventing them from pursuing 
their dreams. One of the major issues in the subprime mortgage crisis 
was the lack of meaningful mortgage servicer regulation.387 Despite 
improvements to the federal consumer protection scheme since that 
time,388 significant gaps in student loan servicer oversight still 
remain.389 Therefore, either the CFPB or SAGs must act to gain 
                                                            
election-updates.php (last visited Jan. 29, 2015) (“The Attorney General is 
popularly elected in 43 states . . . .”). 
381 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(1)-(2) (2012). 
382 DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS 
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 3-21 (1993) (stating that democracy 
requires lawmaking that is done by elected officials rather than unaccountable 
bureaucrats). 
383 See supra Section II.B. 
384 See supra Part III. 
385 See supra Section VI.B. 
386 See supra Section VI.B. 
387 See supra Section IV.A. 
388 See supra Part V. 
389 See supra Section VI.A. 
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substantive protections for student borrowers and to provide for a 
strong state–federal dual-enforcement regime.390 Until then, the 
student borrower is most certainly slave to the servicer. 
                                                            
390 See supra Section VI.C-D. 
